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ABSTRACT 
 
DAVID A. UTHLAUT: Security First: The Response Of The Iraqi Population To 
Counterinsurgency Strategy 
(Under the direction of Charles Kurzman, Neal Caren, and Navin Bapat) 
 
 
 Given the U.S. military’s current engagement with insurgencies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, it is possible and prudent to test the effectiveness of U.S. counterinsurgency 
doctrine in practice.  This article tests the predictive power of access to essential services, 
unemployment, perceptions of improved security, insurgent attacks, and demographic 
characteristics upon Iraqi citizens’ confidence in the counterinsurgent forces and the Iraqi 
insurgency.   It also tests the predictive power of confidence in the various counterinsurgent 
and insurgent forces, as well as the aforementioned variables, upon future attacks.  In the first 
test, survey respondents’ perceptions of improved security and their ethno-sectarian 
community are the most consistent predictors of confidence in counterinsurgent and 
insurgent forces, while the rest are inconsistent or insignificant predictors.  In the second test, 
survey responses from a specific district were insufficient to consistently predict future 
attacks in that same district.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“All insurgencies, even today’s highly adaptable strains, remain wars amongst the people.” 
– U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency 
 
Nearly a decade has passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 
U.S. military remains entangled with a resolute and recalcitrant insurgency in Afghanistan.  
For nearly seven of those years, the U.S. military also fought against a stubborn insurgency 
in Iraq, with varying levels of success over time, yet with enough overall success to 
encourage significant reductions in manpower and resources, enabling a deliberate shift from 
a “combat” role to a “combat advisory” role.    While every militant insurgency is a product 
of its particular environment and place in time, there are certain threads that have remained 
constant throughout the history of insurgencies and revolutionary war (Galula [1964] 2006, 
United States 2006).  With this in mind, an examination of the U.S. military’s 
counterinsurgency doctrine and its effectiveness in Iraq may provide a helpful framework for 
how to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and in future insurgent conflicts.  
For clarity, U.S. military doctrine describes insurgency both as “an organized movement 
aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed 
conflict” (United States 2001) and as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle 
designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying 
power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control” (United States 2006).     
In this article I will review literature on insurgency, counterinsurgency, and 
legitimacy before testing the predictive power of certain variables upon citizens’ confidence 
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in the counterinsurgent forces and the insurgency in Iraq, as well as the power of certain 
variables in predicting insurgent attacks.  The purpose of testing these variables is to assess 
whether or not current strategies based upon U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine are 
effective on the ground.  While no strategy will be perfect, the goal is to find and implement 
one that minimizes the bloodshed of combatants and civilians and sets the conditions for 
peace, liberty, and prosperity.   
 
INSURGENT STRATEGY 
To understand the progression of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is useful 
to reference Mao Tse-Tung’s conception of the phases of insurgency (Mao 1961).  Mao, as 
one of history’s most successful insurgents, included phase descriptions in his strategy to 
overthrow the government in China, and they remain a widely accepted framework for 
understanding how insurgencies can progress, as well as when and why counterinsurgents 
choose to implement particular strategies to defeat them.  During the first phase, the Strategic 
Defensive phase (sometimes called the Latent and Incipient phase), insurgents are generally 
focused on surviving and gaining support for their cause from among the greater population.  
Insurgents hope to gain enough popular support and military strength to move into the 
Strategic Stalemate phase (sometimes called Guerrilla Warfare), where they can often hold 
their ground against the government in small-scale conflicts, while inflicting as much 
damage as possible upon the government forces (personnel, infrastructure, and morale) using 
guerrilla tactics.  At this point it is possible the insurgents can convince the population that 
they have the military capability to succeed in eventually overthrowing the government.  The 
final phase is the Strategic Counteroffensive (sometimes called the War of Movement); this 
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generally occurs when the insurgents have surpassed the military strength of the government 
and are able to engage and defeat them in conventional battles (Mao 1961).  Based upon this 
framework, most would agree that the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan contain guerrilla 
warfare elements at the tactical level primarily, while perhaps not achieving enough military 
parity to be fully classified as in Phase II at the strategic level. 
 
COUNTERINSURGENT STRATEGY 
 The writers of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, with guidance from senior military 
leaders and political officials, have an array of strategies from which to choose, considering 
the course of armed conflict throughout history and past insurgent conflicts (such as 
Vietnam) in which the U.S. has been directly involved.  These strategies generally fall into 
three categories: attrition, negotiation, and legitimization.  
 
Attrition 
A strategy focused strictly on attrition contains two separate sub-strategies, either of 
which may be employed separately or in concert.  The first sub-strategy is akin to what other 
authors have described as “repression” (Karstedt-Henke 1980, Walter 1997, Tarrow 1998, 
Almeida 2003, Bapat, 2005, Davenport 2007) such that the counterinsurgents seek to wipe 
out the insurgents completely, or their leadership at the very least, either by killing or 
capturing them.  The second sub-strategy is attrition of resources (Enders & Sandler 2002), 
where the counterinsurgents target the insurgency’s logistical and financial sources of 
support, assuming that the movement will subside (or terminate) without external resources 
(McCarthy & Zald 1977).   
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Counterinsurgents will often attempt attrition early in the insurgency, especially 
attrition of personnel, as they consider their reputation (Walter 2006) on the international 
stage and the precedent of a weak response to internal rebellion.  Phase I is also where the 
strategy of attrition has its greatest chance of success, due to the relative weakness of the 
insurgency, and before its political objectives become diffuse and gain strength (Minkoff 
1997, Andrews & Biggs 2006) throughout the majority of the population.  Killing or 
capturing the leadership of an insurgent organization serves as a warning to other members of 
the organization, or to anyone considering leading a separate insurgency, and the removal of 
a charismatic leader has the potential to topple a nascent organization (Weber 1947).  Had the 
U.S. succeeded in killing or capturing Osama Bin Laden at Tora Bora in 2001 (Burke 2004, 
Fury 2008), at the very outset of the insurgency in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda would have 
certainly lost steam; perhaps it would have capitulated entirely.  
It seems certain from history that insurgencies in Phase II – or those that have at least 
gained a mass of support and the capability to conduct destructive guerrilla attacks – cannot 
be defeated by attrition alone.  The Russian experience in Afghanistan, and the U.S. 
experiences in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan provide evidence of that.  What may also be 
certain is that the effectiveness of attrition alone, even in Phase I, is limited to Host Nation 
(HN) governments.  Third-party intervening forces, such as the United States, are so vastly 
limited by their lack of knowledge on the terrain, culture, language, history, and insurgent 
grievances during the early stages of the insurgency that they have a very small chance of 
hasty victory.  For strategies of attrition to work, counterinsurgents must know how to 
identify the insurgents as well as where to find them, and the same applies to eliminating the 
support network (Nagl [2002] 2005).   In many insurgencies, however, this ideal situation is 
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simply not a reality.  Insurgents and their supporters often become adept at blending in with 
the rest of the population and conducting covert operations, as their survival depends upon it.  
Furthermore, if the insurgency can consistently outmaneuver and outwit a superior military 
force determined to conduct a concerted attrition campaign, it can give the insurgency a 
somewhat mythical status in the eyes of the population, engendering more support for its 
cause and depleting the credibility of the counterinsurgents attempting to destroy them (Nagl 
[2002] 2005).  It is likely that U.S. military strategists have recognized all of these factors 
working against an attrition-only strategy and have rejected it in favor of one that only 
includes attrition as a small portion of the overall strategy.   
 
Negotiation 
 If we assume that insurgents are rational actors as participants in a social movement 
(Olson 1965, Oberschall 1993, Lake 2002), a possibility exists that counterinsurgents can 
negotiate successfully with elements of the insurgent organization.   Counterinsurgents very 
rarely initiate or agree to negotiations at the outset; to do so would give the insurgency a 
measure of credibility, which states attempt to avoid.  Counterinsurgents will also be hesitant 
to negotiate with insurgents in Phase I due to the same reputational concerns mentioned 
above (Walter 2006).  
 Some counterinsurgents do not seek to negotiate because of a common 
mischaracterization of insurgents.  Political commentators and politicians have often 
projected a certain deviant psychological profile on insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
especially in the wake of a hideous terrorist (perhaps suicide) attack.  If insurgents employing 
these sorts of tactics are either insane or irrationally disaffected members of society, there is 
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no use trying to negotiate with them; they must be killed or captured because they can no 
longer be productive members of society.  However, many scholars have rejected this notion 
(Crenshaw 2000, Pape 2003, Atran 2003), and the International Center for the Study of 
Terrorism at Penn State has concluded in their “Psychology of Terrorism” workshop that 
terrorists do not suffer from a mental disorder and do not fit a specific psychotic profile 
(Horgan 2008). 
The most radical factions of the insurgency, despite their supposed rationality, are not 
likely even to approach the negotiation table, but the more moderate factions may agree to 
compromise the total accomplishment of their political objectives for a partial achievement 
plus an assurance of security (Koopmans 1993, Tarrow 1998, Bueno de Mesquita 2005).  If 
the counterinsurgents can get past the potential embarrassment of negotiating with 
insurgents, they may be successful in defeating the entire insurgency.  Bapat (2005) uses 
empirical data to show that it takes an average of four years for counterinsurgents to reach 
the point where they are willing to negotiate with insurgents.  At this point, they have 
recognized the failures of attrition and assess that it may be in their best interest to reach a 
settlement to achieve lasting peace.  The irony, as Bapat notes, is that the insurgents (as a 
whole) may not want to negotiate at this point because they believe that they have the upper 
hand, giving credence to the assumption that even the most extreme insurgents exercise 
“rational choice.”  Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and Koopmans (1993) suggest that moderate 
insurgents may be willing to negotiate if it suits their personal needs, and that 
counterinsurgents may choose to negotiate with them because of the information of 
intelligence value that moderate insurgents can provide about the remaining radical faction of 
the insurgency.  The respective collapses of the Irish Republican Army and the Front de 
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Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) were largely due to negotiations and valuable intelligence 
exchanged between moderates and the counterinsurgent forces.   
Despite the potential value of negotiations, sometimes there remain many roadblocks 
to success.  If no moderates are willing to negotiate, if the information they provide is not 
credible or valuable enough to bring down the remainder of the insurgency, or if the 
counterinsurgents cannot adequately protect moderates from revenge-seeking insurgents, 
counterinsurgents may have to seek yet another alternative strategy.  The likelihood of a 
third-party intervening force encountering any of those negotiation roadblocks, especially the 
difficulty of protecting moderates from radicals on foreign soil, has no doubt influenced U.S. 
military strategists’ decision to eschew a negotiation-only strategy.   
 
Legitimization 
What remains is the legitimization strategy under which current U.S. 
counterinsurgency doctrine falls.  In 2006, General David Petraeus used some of his own 
lessons learned (Petraeus 2004) to spearhead the creation of the U.S. Army’s new 
counterinsurgency (COIN) manual, Field Manual (FM) 3-24: Counterinsurgency (United 
States 2006), and to inspire its more recent complement, Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2: Tactics 
in Counterinsurgency (United States 2009), in an effort to provide military leaders with a 
greater understanding of insurgents and insurgency, in a particular framework for conducting 
counterinsurgency operations.  The primary framework the authors prescribed depends on the 
dual assumptions that a) the Host Nation (HN) population determines the legitimacy of the 
counterinsurgents and the insurgents, and b) whichever side gains this legitimacy will 
achieve military victory and perhaps establish a regime of relative permanence.  FM 3-24 
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repeats this theme on multiple occasions: “The long-term objective for all sides remains 
acceptance of the legitimacy1 of one side’s claim to political power by the people of the state 
or region”; “Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy 
and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency”; “The primary struggle in an 
internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy”; “Success 
requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of the uncommitted middle, 
which also includes passive supporters of both sides”; and “The primary objective of any 
COIN [counterinsurgency] operation is to foster development of effective governance by a 
legitimate government” (United States 2006). 
 
What is legitimacy? 
 Legitimacy, according to Weber ([1946] 1958), is an “inner justification” that 
compels the voluntary obedience of the population to the state.  Similarly, Lipset’s widely 
accepted definition of legitimacy “involves the capacity to engender and maintain the belief 
that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society” (Lipset 
[1959] 1981).  Elsewhere, he refers to legitimacy as “an accepted systemic ‘title to rule,’” the 
alternative to force among a regime’s options for creating stability (Lipset 1994).  Dogan 
(1992) believes that institutions must not only be appropriate, they must also be considered 
“morally proper” to be legitimate.   Linz presents a slightly more cynical view of legitimacy, 
that “in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political institutions are better than any others 
that might be established and therefore can demand obedience” (Linz 1988).  As an example, 
he makes the case that the Nazi movement gained legitimacy in Germany because a 
                                                        
1Italics on “legitimacy” or “legitimate” in this paragraph are not included in the original text. 
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tumultuous economic and political situation had left them with two options: “chaos or Hitler” 
(Linz 1978).   Kurzman would appear to support Linz’ minimalist definition, suggesting that 
support for a regime may be more akin to “grudging acquiescence” due to the lack of any 
other “viable option” (Kurzman 2004).   
 
Where does legitimacy come from? 
 Weber’s ([1946] 1958) framework for the sources of legitimacy remains a strong 
touchstone in contemporary literature.  He saw three basic categories of legitimacy: 
traditional, charismatic, and legal, the latter of which has also been called “rational-legal” 
(Lipset 1994).   When a population accepts the authority of its rulers because countless 
previous generations have done the same, as with modern European monarchies, this is 
known as traditional legitimacy.  Charismatic legitimacy arises when the people collectively 
conceive of a particular leader as having (perhaps divine) gifts and abilities to lead, rendering 
him better suited or more deserving than any other to assume the mantle of leadership.  
Rational-legal legitimacy generally comes from adherence to a written code of laws, such as 
a Constitution, and becomes continually reinforced by the demonstrated competence of the 
regime (Weber [1946] 1958).  In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, or other newly emergent 
regimes, it is clear that they cannot rely upon the past for traditional authority, narrowing the 
options to charismatic and legal-rational legitimacy.  And while charismatic authority may be 
effective immediately following a revolution or other regime change, its dependence upon a 
leader’s personal characteristics is inherently unstable and temporary, leaving only legal-
rational authority for those seeking long-term stability (Lipset 1963).   It is therefore 
incumbent upon new regimes to draft a governing document, such as a Constitution, and seek 
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its ratification rapidly (Ackerman 1992, Weingast 1993, Lipset 1994).  When a regime 
subjects itself to the constraints of a Constitution, particularly when the Constitution grants 
the people the ability to periodically elect new leaders (Lipset 1963, Lipset 1994), it is 
reasonable to assume that the people would grant the regime more authority.   
A document alone cannot create legitimacy and stability for a regime, however.  
Continual demonstrated competence is the only way for a new regime to build legitimacy; it 
must “deliver the goods” (Brogan 1948).  Various authors have noted that this competence 
includes the objective capacity to provide essential services (Schumpeter [1950] 1975, Weil 
1989), maintain “civil order, personal security, adjudication and arbitration of conflicts, and a 
minimum of predictability in the making and implementation of decisions” (Linz 1978), and 
nurture a productive economy (Lipset 1994).  Others have stressed that competence has a 
subjective component – that legitimacy comes from the regime’s ability to provide what its 
people want (Lipset [1959] 1981, Diamond et. al. 1990) – and that may differ from 
population to population.   
Legitimacy is not an absolute condition that a regime must attain and maintain; there 
exists instead a scale or continuum upon which legitimacy slides (Hertz 1978, Dogan 1992, 
Kurzman 2004), often dependent upon the perceived competence of the regime.  Kurzman 
(2004) also observes that a new movement may gain enough legitimacy to challenge an 
existing regime at a point of “critical mass,” but there has been no reliable way to measure 
exactly when this occurs or what conditions must first be in place.  Similarly, there may be a 
point of “critical absence” for an existing regime, at which time the balance has undeniably 
shifted and it no longer has enough legitimacy to maintain authority.  It seems that an 
appropriate, yet theoretically lacking, description of when a regime has reached either critical 
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mass or critical absence matches the equally appropriate and equally theoretically lacking 
definition of terrorism: “We’ll know it when we see it.”  
 The framework presented in FM 3-24 for achieving legitimacy consists of seven 
“Logical Lines of Operation” or “Lines of Effort”: combat operations, civil security 
operations (also called civil control), developing Host Nation (HN) security forces, 
delivering essential services, providing governance, fostering economic development, and 
managing perceptions through information operations (United States 2006).  
 
Figure 1: Example Counterinsurgency Framework from FM 3-24 
 
Figure 2 below, taken from FM 3-24.2, provides concrete examples of the sorts of 
tasks involved with each of the seven Lines of Effort (United States 2009).  The prescription 
of the counterinsurgency framework, therefore, is that success in each of seven Lines of 
Effort will create legitimacy for the Host Nation government and thus set the conditions for 
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victory over the insurgency.  This strategy runs counter to traditional military norms of 
conventional force-on-force, and past conflicts have shown how the U.S. military has 
struggled to become a “learning organization” and adapt to unconventional conflict (Nagl 
[2002] 2005). 
These more recent manuals do not mark a distinct theoretical or strategic break from 
the two preceding documents, however.  Field Manual (FM) 90-8: Counterguerrilla 
Operations defines counterinsurgency as “the program which addresses both the populace 
and the insurgent” and notes that “counterguerilla operations are geared to the active military 
element of the insurgent movement only” (United States 1986).  Furthermore, it exhorts 
commanders to recognize “the fact that neutralization of the guerrilla is only one-third of the 
COIN [counterinsurgency] strategy,” that “balanced development of the country and 
mobilization of the populace against the insurgents must occur simultaneously for the 
insurgency to be defeated,” and “the primary consideration when planning counterguerrilla 
operations is the effect operations will have on the populace…commanders must attempt to 
win the active support of the population for the government” (United States 1986).  In the 
same vein, Field Manual (FM): Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict states that 
“legitimacy is the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict” and “the 
insurgent must have either the active or passive support of the populace to succeed” (United 
States 1992).  
Despite the theoretical congruence between the old and the new manuals, the majority 
of the pages in FM 90-8 are dedicated to counterguerilla operations, akin to the “Combat 
Operations” Line of Effort (United States 1986).  It appears that the authors of both FM 90-8 
and FM 7-98 never envisioned a scenario where combat commanders and ground troops 
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would be responsible for other Lines of Effort, such as the delivery of essential services or 
improving the local economy; they saw this more as the role of the Host Nation government, 
or perhaps specially trained “Civil Affairs” Soldiers (United States 1986, United States 
1992).  By contrast, FM 3-24 and FM 3-24.2 dedicate much more space to theoretical 
legitimacy and specific non-lethal means of “winning the population,” reflecting the reality 
combat commanders and ground troops have faced in Iraq and Afghanistan – that they are 
responsible for all seven Lines of Effort. 
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Figure 2: Operationalized Counterinsurgency Framework, from FM 3-24.2 
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Practical Considerations 
Beyond the somewhat abstract concept of legitimacy, there are some very practical 
reasons for counterinsurgents to adopt a strategy centered on meeting the needs of the 
population.  The tangible power citizens possess can be considerable, especially when large 
portions of the population agree to take a stand together on one side, at one particular point in 
time.   A great example of this is the impact of the Sunni moderates’ “Awakening” in Iraq in 
2007 (Long 2008).   David Galula’s2 book on counterinsurgency warfare (Galula [1964] 
2006) and FM 3-24 both provide compelling reasons why the weight of the civilians is so 
important, especially as the loss of one element of power usually means that the enemy has 
gained it, doubling the impact.  Here are just a few of those elements: 
 
Recruits 
The fighters among the insurgents generally have a high attrition rate, and therefore 
they need to replenish their ranks quickly to sustain the organization.  By the same token, 
defeating an insurgency requires a strong and capable Host Nation (HN) security force to 
protect the population, and manning this force requires a steady flow of recruits as well.  
Members of the population can vote with their feet by joining the armed ranks of either side, 
increasing the numerical strength of their chosen force.   
 
Intelligence   
 In an environment where the insurgent looks just like any other person among the 
civilian population, accurate intelligence is absolutely critical for the counterinsurgent.  With 
                                                        
2 Galula was a Colonel in the French Army at the time of the Algerian insurgency. 
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good intelligence, the counterinsurgent can deny the enemy safe-haven and freedom of 
movement in a particular area, while also ensuring freedom of movement for his own force.  
Intelligence certainly helps the insurgent as well, but he still maintains an advantage if he can 
merely keep the civilian population from speaking to either party.     
 
Financial and Logistical Support 
 Insurgencies, like other social movements, require external resources to succeed 
(McCarthy & Zald 1977).  External support is more critical to the insurgent than to the 
counterinsurgent, as insurgencies generally do not have a state economy upon which to 
depend for financial support – save those insurgencies buoyed by transnational state 
sponsorship (Bapat 2009, Bapat 2010) – and the necessity for them to remain covert requires 
both active and passive logistical support from the civilian population.  Winning over the 
population and convincing them to turn off their financial and logistical support for the 
insurgency is a much more indirect approach than targeting and eliminating the sources of 
support (as in the attrition strategy), although it accomplishes the same purpose.     
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INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN IRAQ 
Method  
 Throughout the remainder of this study, I will be using Iraqi citizens’ confidence 
levels as a measure of the success and legitimacy of the counterinsurgents.   Some have 
cautioned that public confidence in particular institutions may not be analogous to confidence 
in a particular regime type (Citrin 1974, Lipset & Schneider [1983] 1987, Dogan 1992, 
Kurzman 2004), such as democracy in Iraq.  However, confidence levels do tend to be a 
positive indicator of political stability (Useem & Useem 1979), and where there are very low 
levels of regime legitimacy, such as is the case with new regimes (Lipset 1994), the survival 
of the regime in a time of crisis likely depends upon the performance of the institutions in the 
regime and the perceptions thereof by its constituents (Dahl 1971). 
 Using survey data and attack data collected in Iraq from 2004 to 2006, I will test: 1) 
which factors are most predictive of citizens’ confidence in counterinsurgents and insurgents, 
and 2) which factors are most predictive of attacks in a particular area.  The results should 
inform us as to which Lines of Effort were the most effective at “winning hearts and minds” 
and reducing attacks in Iraq from 2004-2006, while potentially offering a prescription for 
future counterinsurgency operations.  Specifically, I will test three of the seven Lines of 
Effort presented in FM 3-24 and FM 3-24.2: Restore Essential Services, Support Economic 
and Infrastructure Development, and Establish Civil Security.   
 
Essential Services 
Addressing deficiencies in the delivery of essential services is not only a way for 
counterinsurgents to demonstrate legitimacy and good will towards the civilian population, it 
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may also address particular grievances exploited by the insurgents to defame the legitimacy 
of government.  Berman, et al. have written extensively on strategies that the U.S. military 
has employed in Iraq, strategies meant to address potential roots of the insurgency instead of 
simply eliminating the fighters.  In their forthcoming article “Can Hearts and Minds be 
Bought?  The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq” (Draft 2009) they analyzed the 
effects of applied Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds on levels of 
insurgent violence.  Combat commanders at all levels have access to these funds, and they 
often use them to address deficiencies in essential services, usually with the added benefit of 
contracting Iraqi civilians to carry out the work.  The authors found, not surprisingly, that 
U.S. commanders spent CERP funds more liberally in areas where attacks had been more 
frequent.  They also found that attacks tended to decrease in areas where essential services 
had improved, and that the impact of CERP funds tended to be greater in areas that were less 
self-sustaining (and thus more dependent).   A separate study conducted by the U.S. Army’s 
1st Cavalry Division in Sadr City at the end of 2004 also found a “direct correlation between 
enemy actions and lack of basic services” (Chiarelli & Michaelis 2005).   
 
Unemployment 
Lack of employment may also be a source of grievance for the civilian population, 
and one might also make an argument that employed men are less likely to become involved 
in an insurgency.  Empirical tests have thus far not supported this hypothesis, however.  In an 
article called “Do Working Men Rebel?  Insurgency and Unemployment in Iraq and the 
Philippines,” Berman, et al. (2009) used district-level data to compare World Food Program 
unemployment statistics with district-level attack data in Iraq, and they actually find a 
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negative and significant relationship.  This relationship exists, the authors argue, because: 1) 
in the hopes of receiving monetary reward, unemployed individuals may be more likely to 
share information about enemy activity, which could lead to a decrease in attacks; 2) areas 
that have stricter security, in the form of checkpoints, may in fact constrict trade and supply 
routes, thereby causing a loss of jobs; or 3) unemployed individuals may desire to participate 
in attacks, but they may feel a stronger urge to provide for their families first, and therefore 
they spend their time seeking work instead of planning and conducting attacks.   
 
Security 
 Some would argue that the best way to win the support of the population is to protect 
them (Galula [1964] 2006).  If the people do not believe that the counterinsurgents can 
protect them from insurgent attacks or from being victims of criminal activity, they may turn 
to the insurgents for protection.  Under the heading of security would also be the topic of 
collateral damage.   In a counterinsurgency fight, it is of the utmost importance for 
counterinsurgents to limit collateral damage.  This takes concerted effort and potentially 
substantial restraint on the part of the counterinsurgents, but excessive collateral damage has 
devastating impacts on the ability of the counterinsurgents to gain the trust and support of the 
population.  In a recent study of collateral damage in Iraq, Condra and Shapiro (Draft 2010) 
found that where counterinsurgents are responsible for collateral damage, insurgent attacks 
will increase, and where insurgents are responsible for collateral damage, insurgent attacks 
will decrease.  They attribute this effect to information sharing, such that civilians 
uninvolved directly in the insurgency will withhold information about enemy activity from 
counterinsurgents when they have caused collateral damage, leading to higher insurgent 
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attacks; conversely, they will readily provide information to counterinsurgents when 
insurgents are to blame for collateral damage, leading to a decrease in attacks (Condra & 
Shapiro, Draft 2010). 
 
Survey Data 
Due to the largely prohibitive environment of an ongoing insurgency, few researchers 
have been able to compile credible or large-scale opinion surveys in Iraq.  However, from 
September 2004 until September 2006, the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil 
Society Studies (IIACSS)3 administered monthly surveys in Iraq and coded the data.  From 
September 2004 to September 2005, researchers limited the surveys to Baghdad Province; 
from October 2005 to September 2006, the interviewers expanded their target population to 
include all eighteen provinces in Iraq.  The U.S. Army sponsored the study and also worked 
closely with the director of IIACSS in Iraq to create the survey questions from month to 
month. 
There are two months during this time period, November and December 2004, where 
there is no survey data available.  According to the IIACSS director, Mr. Munqith Daghir, 
the security situation in Baghdad was too dangerous for his interviewers during these two 
months, so they did not conduct the interviews.  This is certainly understandable when one 
considers two major events with impacts in Baghdad: 1) Operation Phantom Fury4, also 
called the Second Battle of Fallujah, spanned from November 7 to December 23, 2004, 
                                                        
3 http://www.iiacss.org/  
 
4 See Dick Camp’s 2009 book, Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah, Iraq, 
Minneapolis, MN, Zenith Press.   
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highlighting a time of intense fighting between Sunni insurgents and counterinsurgents; 2) 
the first post-Saddam Hussein election, well-advertised to occur at the end of January 2005, 
made the two preceding months a critical time for the insurgents to intimidate the general 
population.  
 
Interviewers 
 The IIACSS hired interviewers on a part-time basis, and they selected them from 
among the Iraqi populace to cover regions about which they had intimate knowledge.  Nearly 
all of the interviewers had completed four years of university education and a Bachelor’s 
Degree in the social sciences, and Mr. Daghir referred to all of them as “very experienced 
professionals.”5.  The IIACSS also had a system of supervisory checks in place to ensure the 
veracity of the interviewers’ work, including having at least one auditor responsible for each 
region to check 100% of the questionnaires for accuracy and completeness, and the auditors 
would visit at least twenty residences per region per month to monitor the interview process.  
Interviewers worked in two-person teams, one male and one female, to encourage a higher 
response rate from women; this precaution was especially important in the more rural and 
conservative areas.     
As mentioned above, interviewers faced significant threats from militias, terrorists, 
and other insurgent factions.   The methodology report states, “many interviewers have been 
captured or threatened by militias…they have been accused as spies for the Americans.”  The 
fortunate ones were forced by Sharia courts to quit their jobs.  Others were not quite so 
                                                        
5 Email correspondence sent March 30, 2010 
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fortunate.  Mr. Daghir reported6 the following: “On [sic] June 2006 I have [sic] lost 3 
interviewers in the North of Baghdad when they were doing their interviews. We found two 
of them 7 days later beheaded, and the third one is still not found. Not less than 60-70% of 
my interviewers [were] either sent to Gail [sic], kidnapped or beaten one time or more.”   
 
Sampling Design 
For the waves of interviews specific to Baghdad only, from October 2004 to 
September 2005, the target population was all adults (above age eighteen) in Baghdad 
Province, while the waves of interviews from October 2005 to September 2006 targeted all 
adults (above age eighteen) in Iraq.  The sampling frame consisted of all adults with 
residential listings in Baghdad Province from the 1997 Population Census in Iraq (for the 
waves October 2004 – September 2005) and within all of Iraq (for the waves October 2005 – 
September 2006).  
To select specific individuals for the interviews, the researchers used a “multi-stage 
probability-based sample,” with a five-stage process to narrow down the sampling frame.  
For the first and second stages, they used the 1997 Census to determine the population-
weighted sample for urban districts (qadas) and sub-districts (nahias).  Inside of the nahias, 
the researchers chose blocks (urban areas) and villages (rural areas) as their primary 
sampling units (PSUs) from the census data, planning thirty interviews per PSU.  Within the 
PSUs, interviewers selected the particular street on which they would conduct their 
interviews using a “simple random method,” and once inside each household, they selected 
the adult to interview using the “last birthday method.”  If an older Iraqi citizen did not know 
                                                        
6 Email correspondence sent March 30, 2010 
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his or her birthday, interviewers assigned a birthday to that individual from a list of random 
dates carried by all interviewers.  Interviewers also used simple rules to choose a residence at 
random in the event that the address to the pre-planned household was incorrect once they 
arrived at the location.   
Prior to the recorded survey data, the researchers conducted a pilot survey on twenty 
households from different areas of Baghdad, and they modified their questionnaire to reflect 
this feedback.   
 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
In regard to the IIACSS data, the greatest strength is the sheer effort and human cost 
expended to conduct the interviews in the midst of an ongoing insurgency.  Additionally, the 
sample selection method appears to be probability-based, the sample is quite large, and there 
was a very high response rate. 
The first set of waves, in Baghdad Province only, sampled all nine qadas in the city 
proper and an additional qada covering the rural portion of the province, simply called 
“Rural Baghdad.”  However, the second set of waves sampled only forty-eight qadas 
(districts) of the 106 nationwide.  While there is no data available to determine the population 
of each of these qadas, the surveyed qadas do contain all of the major population centers in 
Iraq, mainly along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers (see Figure 15 on pg. 37 for a map), and 
there is at least one qada included from each of the eighteen provinces in Iraq.   
Another potential limitation of using these data is the possibility that respondents may 
have felt pressure, whether intentional or unintentional, to answer questions in a certain way.  
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Mr. Daghir reports7 that interviewers “present themselves as interviewers working in an 
independent research institute.  Mostly they belong to the same geographical area that they 
survey and got different permissions from different formal and informal sides. They show 
these legal permissions to the respondents to make them sure that we are [a] legal entity.”  
Even with these assurances from the interviewers, respondents may have still been suspicious 
or fearful of their intentions, given Iraq’s history of repression for those who vocalize 
dissenting opinions (Folsche 2007, Atwan 2008, Dworkin, et. al., 2008).  
Additionally, a respondent may have recognized an interviewer from her geographic 
area, which may have biased her answers.  The methodology report made no mention of this 
particular issue, however. 
Mr. Daghir reports they have found some mistakes in the data, even with their system 
of multiple checks, and after having made necessary corrections he feels “80-90% 
comfortable with the data.”  While these statistics and the other limitations are certainly not 
ideal, I believe they are acceptable given the dangerous environment, large sample size, and 
the potential value of such a rare data set. 
 
Prior Research 
I know of two previous empirical studies that have employed these survey data.  
Schnack used data from a single month to support her “case for the separation of hearts and 
minds” in Iraq, in which she conceptualized “winning hearts” as tolerance for the presence of 
Coalition Forces and “winning minds” as support for a democratic form of government.  She 
concluded that the U.S. military had succeeded in winning the minds of the Iraqi people, but 
                                                        
7 Email correspondence sent March 30, 2010 
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had not yet won their hearts. (Schnack 2006).  A second study using these data focuses on the 
effects of war on the Iraqi people, specifically the youth, reminding us that the perils of war 
impact many lives beyond just those of the combatants (Carlton-Ford, et. al. 2008).   
 
Historical Background 
 Chaos and uncertainty characterized the time period in which the surveys took place.   
The Sunni Arab portion of the insurgency had already left its mark, brazenly capturing, 
killing, and mutilating the bodies of four U.S. contractors on March 31, 2004 (Frederick 
2010), and the Shia Arab militants under the leadership of Moqtada al-Sadr joined the 
insurgency around the same time (Fattah 2009).  On June 28, 2004 the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA), led by L. Paul Bremer of the United States, ceded authority in Iraq to the 
Interim Government, led by former Iraqi exile Ayad Allawi (Frederick 2010).  These events 
helped set the stage for a predictable struggle between the Sunni insurgents seeking to oust 
the Coalition Forces and regain power in Iraq, the Sadrist militants seeking to oust the 
Coalition Forces and place their adherents in positions of power, and the fledgling Iraqi 
government supported by the Coalition Forces.  The following timeline shows the major 
events that took place in Iraq from September 2004 – September 2006, the time frame in 
which the surveys were administered.   
*Nov. 8, 2004: U.S. assault on Fallujah begins  
*Nov. 14, 2004:  U.S. forces declare Fallujah liberated 
*Jan. 30, 2005:  First Free National Elections in Iraq 
*May 3, 2005:  Transitional Government succeeds the Interim Government 
*Jul. 17, 2005:  Formal charges brought against the captured Saddam Hussein 
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*Oct. 15, 2005:  Iraqi Constitution ratified by national referendum 
*Feb. 22, 2006: Askaria Shrine bombing in Samarra 
*Jun. 30, 2006:  Rape/murder of Iraqi girl in Yusafiya (by U.S. Soldier) reported 
 
Initial Analysis 
I created a “community” variable to distinguish Sunni Kurds from Sunni Arabs, as 
well as Sunni Arabs from Shia Arabs, and to assign sects to those who only listed that they 
were “Muslim” when asked about their religion.  To do this I looked at particular regions, 
proceeding from the province to the qada/city to the block (largest region to the smallest 
region).  Where there was greater than a 5 to 1 ratio of respondents in that area who classified 
themselves as either "Sunni Arab" or "Shia Arab", I classified “Muslim Only” respondents as 
the majority sect.  Where there was less than a 5 to 1 ratio, I classified that community as 
"Mixed Arab".  The results of this classification method (depicted in Figure 3 at the 
provincial level) accurately reflect publically available ethnic maps of Iraq, as well as my 
working knowledge from nearly three years spent in Iraq.  The fifth category for the 
community variable is “Other”, consisting of the ethnic and religious minorities such as 
Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turks, Christians, Sabees, and Yazidis, and for the purposes of the 
models I separated the community variable into dummy variables.  The largest community 
among the respondents was Shia Arab (49%), followed by Sunni Arab (20%), Mixed Arab 
(18%), Kurdish (10%), and Other (3%).  
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Figure 3: 5 to 1 Community Distribution at the Provincial Level 
 
The graphs below show the average level of confidence each of the communities have 
in each of the counterinsurgent and insurgent groups over time, and I created two separate 
graphs for each of those categories.  Since the first half of the survey waves were only 
conducted in Baghdad, one graph shows the average level of confidence for Baghdad all the 
way through both waves, and the other graph just shows the second half of the waves, but it 
includes all provinces.  I have also included major events in Iraq at the bottom of the graphs, 
to see if there are any discernable patterns potentially tied to those events.   
The first pair of graphs (Figures 4 & 5) shows that the Arab population remained 
relatively consistent in their reported confidence in Coalition Forces, and that the Shia Arabs 
have the greatest confidence (albeit very low) in Coalition Forces, the Sunni Arabs have the 
lowest confidence in Coalition Forces, and the Mixed Arab communities fall in between.  It 
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is also apparent from the second graph that there is a vast disparity between the Kurdish8 and 
Arab communities in their level of confidence in the Coalition Forces.   
 In Figures 6 & 7 we see that Kurds and Shia Arabs have high level of confidence in 
the Iraqi Government, while the Sunni Arabs’ level is quite low, with the Mixed Arab 
communities in between.  The Kurds likely considered the new government of Iraq a step up 
from the previous regime.  Likewise, the Shia Arabs, as the majority sect in Iraq, also made 
up the majority of the Iraqi Government at the time of the survey, so it is no surprise that they 
were much more confident in the Iraqi Government than the minority Sunni Arabs.  I also 
appears there is more variation by community in Baghdad, a trend that continues through all 
of the graphs.   
                                                        
8 There is an extremely small number of Kurds living in Baghdad (0.9% according to the later 
waves), which is why their line is not distinguishable in the graphs of the Baghdad waves throughout.   
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Figure 4: Confidence in Coalition Forces, Baghdad Only, Sep ’04 – Sep ‘06 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Confidence in Coalition Forces, Nationwide, Oct ’05 – Sep ‘06 
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Figure 6: Confidence in the Iraqi Government, Baghdad Only, Sep ’04 – Sep ‘06 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Confidence in the Iraqi Government, Nationwide, Oct ’05 – Sep ‘06 
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Figure 8: Confidence in the Iraqi Police, Baghdad Only, Sep ’04 – Sep ‘06 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Confidence in the Iraqi Police, Nationwide, Oct ’05 – Sep ‘06 
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Figure 10: Confidence in the Iraqi Army, Baghdad Only, Sep ’04 – Sep ‘06 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Confidence in the Iraqi Army, Nationwide, Oct ’05 – Sep ‘06 
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Figure 12: Confidence in the Insurgency, Baghdad Only, Sep ’04 – Sep ‘06 
Figure 13: Confidence in the Insurgency, Nationwide, Oct ’05 – Sep ‘06 
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Figures 8 through 11 are remarkably similar in their patterns, suggesting that 
confidence levels in the Iraqi Police are probably tied to the same variables as confidence 
levels in the Iraqi Army.  As with the Iraqi Government, the Kurds and Shia Arabs are on the 
high end of the confidence scale, the Sunni Arabs are on the low end, and the Mixed Arabs 
are in the middle.  This makes sense, as the Kurds are most likely considering the police and 
army (“Peshmerga”) forces in Kurdistan, which are made up of fellow Kurds.  By the same 
token Shia Arabs make up the majority of the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army in Arab regions, 
which could account for their high confidence levels – and the low levels from the Sunni 
Arabs.     
Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency)9 follows a relatively 
predictable pattern along ethno-sectarian lines, as shown in Figures 12 and 13.  At the 
national level more than half of the Sunni Arabs expressed confidence in the Sunni-
dominated insurgency, while only 15-20% of the other communities are confident in the 
insurgency.  Sunni Arabs’ confidence in the insurgency inside of Baghdad is more variable 
from month to month, however, and in Baghdad less than half of the Sunni population 
expressed confidence in the insurgency on average across the waves.    
 Interestingly, a cross-tabulation of the confidence variables shows that an individual’s 
confidence in a counterinsurgent group does not necessarily preclude that same individual 
from having confidence in the insurgency at the same time.  While only 4% of respondents 
reported confidence in both Coalition Forces and the insurgency, that number is not 
inconsequential because only 10% of the respondents reported confidence in Coalition 
Forces to begin with.  The percentages for respondents who reported confidence in both an 
                                                        
9 There was a codebook error with this question in the June 2006 wave, and I made the necessary 
adjustment. 
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Iraqi counterinsurgent force and the insurgency are much higher, with 19% confident in the 
Iraqi Government and the insurgency, 22% confident in the Iraqi Police and the insurgency, 
and 20% confident in the Iraqi Army and the insurgency.  This seems to suggest that there 
may be competing loyalties within the population, and that institutional confidence is not an 
absolute quantity belonging to one side or the other.  
 
Attack Data 
 The second data set included in this study contains counts of insurgent attacks against 
Coalition Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and civilians over the same period of time.  The 
Multi-National Corps—Iraq headquarters collected the point data, and in its current form the 
data contains aggregate attacks per month, per qada (district).  As mentioned above, the 
survey data only sampled forty-eight of 106 qadas, so I dropped the attack data from qadas 
not included in the survey.  However, the remaining qadas accounted for approximately 68% 
of the total attacks in Iraq during the period the survey was conducted.  The following graph 
shows the number of insurgent attacks across all qadas and months in which the surveys 
were conducted. 
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Figure 14: Insurgent Attacks Across All of Iraq, Sep ’04 – Sep ‘06 
  
Among the forty-eight qadas in which surveys were conducted, I used the survey data 
to determine which community made up the highest percentage of the population in each 
one.  Shia Arab qadas, in Baghdad and southern Iraq, accounted for twenty-eight of the 
forty-eight qadas; Sunni Arab qadas, mostly in western and northern Iraq, accounted for 
twelve; Mixed Arab qadas, in Baghdad and Diyala provinces, accounted for five; and 
Kurdish qadas, in the northernmost part of Iraq, accounted for the remaining three.  To show 
the location and volume of insurgent attacks over the two-year period, I created the two maps 
below.   The graphs below the maps depict the number of insurgent attacks over time, 
separated by community, with community based upon the qadas where that community 
makes up the highest percentage of the population.     
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Figure 15: Insurgent Attacks in Iraq from Sep '04 - Sep '06 
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Figure 16: Insurgent Attacks in Baghdad proper from Sep '04 - Sep '06 
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Figure 17: Insurgent Attacks in Shia Arab Qadas from Sep ’04 – Sep ‘06 
 
Figure 18: Insurgent Attacks in Sunni Arab Qadas from Sep ’04 – Sep ‘06 
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Figure 19: Insurgent Attacks in Mixed Arab Qadas from Sep ’04 – Sep ‘06 
 
Figure 20: Insurgent Attacks in Kurdish Qadas from Sep ’04 – Sep ‘06 – Large Scale  
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Figure 21: Insurgent Attacks in Kurdish Qadas from Sep ’04 – Sep ‘06 - Small Scale 
 
  
 
TEST I 
Dependent Variables 
 Given both the counterinsurgents’ and insurgents’ imperative to win the support of 
the population, whether for legitimacy or for other practical reasons described above, my 
dependent variables for the first test are measures of respondent confidence in the various 
elements of the counterinsurgent force in Iraq, as well as confidence in the “Armed National 
Opposition” (insurgency) in Iraq.   The counterinsurgent force is made up of the Coalition 
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Forces10, Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi Government.  I coded the confidence for 
each variable as “yes” if respondents reported that they had either “some” or a “great deal” of 
confidence in the particular organization and “no” if they had “not very much” or “none”.     
 
Independent Variables 
To test the effects of essential services, unemployment, and feelings of security on 
confidence in particular groups or institutions, I used responses to survey questions most 
nearly approximating each category.   For clean drinking water (“water”), cooking fuel 
(“cookfuel”) and vehicle gas (“gas”), I coded the variable as “yes” if the respondent reported 
being “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the availability of the service, or if they 
reported that their family can access the service “most of the time” or “always”11.  I coded 
the variable “no” if the respondent reported being “somewhat dissatisfied” or “very 
dissatisfied” with the availability of the service, or if they reported that their family can 
access the service “some of the time,” “not very often,” or “never.”  For electricity (“elec”), I 
coded the variable as “yes” if the respondent reported having access to electricity for thirteen 
hours a day or more and “no” otherwise.   For unemployment (“unemployed”), I coded it 
“yes” if the respondent or anyone in his/her household was not only unemployed but also did 
not identify as a student, a housewife, a retiree, or disabled.  For security (“security”), I 
coded the variable as “yes” if the respondent reported that the conditions for security and 
                                                        
10 “Coalition Forces” here refers to the military forces of a wide range of nations who supported 
efforts in Iraq, but most nations limited their military’s presence and roles in Iraq.  The militaries of 
the United States and Britain conducted the vast majority of the street patrols in Iraq, and therefore it 
is highly probable that respondents would associate the term “Coalition Forces” with either the 
militaries of the United States or Britain, with the latter only likely in the city of Basrah.   
 
11 This reflects a slight difference in the verbiage of the question in the second half of the waves.   
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peace had improved over the past three months and “no” if conditions had worsened or 
stayed the same. 
All of the previous independent variables applied to the individual level.  The final 
independent variable I used in this test was the number of attacks per qada-month.  Within 
the attack data set, there are two separate attack variables.  The first variable (“sigact”) lists 
the count for all significant activities (attacks) in the qada-month, including attacks against 
both military and civilian targets.  The second variable (“sig1”) lists the count for all attacks 
that could be positively identified as against a military target, including Coalition Forces, 
Iraqi Police, and Iraqi Army elements.  Since the level of overall violence, irrespective of the 
target, is likely to impact respondents’ confidence levels in either the counterinsurgents or 
insurgents, I used the “sigact” data for this test.  Additionally, since the surveys were given at 
different times throughout the month, I used attack data from the previous month as the most 
accurate measure of violence that might impact a respondent’s confidence levels.  Finally, I 
took the natural log of the lagged attack variable to give a more normal distribution of the 
error term, creating the variable I ultimately used in the model: “l1_ln_sigact”.  Four of the 
survey waves, from October 2005 to January 2006, did not record the qada, so I aggregated 
attacks up to the provincial level for a separate analysis of those four waves. 
 
Control Variables 
 My control variables in this analysis are sex, age, education, community, and month.  
For sex, I coded “male” as 1 for men and 0 for women.  The age range for survey 
respondents was 18 to 100; I created a binary variable (“over40”) for use in the model, 
coding those from age 40-100 as 1 and from age 18-39 as 0.  I chose this age distinction 
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primarily because those over 40 years of age at the time of the survey would have lived 
through at least three separate regime changes: the Ba’athist regime takeover from the Aref 
regime in 1968, headed by Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr; the regime takeover by Saddam Hussein 
and the creation of the Mukhabarat (Intelligence) State in 1979; and the defeat of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in 2003 (Fattah 2009).  The older age group would also have a distinct 
memory of at least three wars:  the Iran-Iraq war from 1980-1988, the war with the 
U.S./Coalition in 1991 (“Operation Desert Storm”), and the war with the U.S./Coalition 
beginning in 2003 (Fattah 2009).  For education, respondents had the choice of “none,” 
“primary,” “intermediate,” “secondary,” “diploma,” “baccalaureate,” and “post-graduate.”  I 
created the variable “collgrad” to distinguish those who had completed at least a bachelor’s 
degree, coding “baccalaureate” and “post-graduate” as 1 and the rest as 0 (“diploma” refers 
to a high school diploma in Iraq).  Approximately 10% of the respondents reported that they 
had graduated from college.  I also included the “community” variable as described in the 
initial analysis portion above.  Finally, I created dummy variables for each month (“yrmo”) 
in which the survey was conducted to control for external fixed effects from that particular 
month. 
 
Test I Hypotheses 
 The following hypotheses reflect the assumptions of legitimacy theories and U.S. 
military counterinsurgency doctrine: 
*H1a: Individuals with greater access to clean drinking water, cooking fuel (propane), 
vehicle gas, and electricity  will have greater confidence in Coalition Forces, the Iraqi 
Government, the Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi Army (positive and significant relgationship). 
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*H1b: Individuals with greater access to clean drinking water, cooking fuel (propane), 
vehicle gas, and electricity will have less confidence in the Armed National Opposition 
(insurgency) (negative and significant relationship) .   
*H2a: Individuals who are unemployed will have less confidence in Coalition Forces, the 
Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi Army (negative and significant 
relationship). 
*H2b: Individuals who are unemployed will have greater confidence in the Armed National 
Opposition (insurgency) (positive and significant relationship).   
*H3a: Individuals who believe that security has improved over the previous three months 
will have greater confidence in Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Police, and 
the Iraqi Army (positive and significant relationship).   
*H3b: Individuals who believe that security has improved over the previous three months 
will have less confidence in the Armed National Opposition (insurgency) (negative and 
significant relationship). 
*H4a: Individuals who experience a higher level of attacks in their qada (district) in the 
previous month will have less confidence in Coaliton Forces, the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi 
Police, and the Iraqi Army (negative and significant relationship). 
*H4b: Individuals who experience a higher level of attacks in their qada (district) in the 
previous month will have less confidence in the Armed National Opposition (insurgency) 
(negative and significant relationship).   
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Test I Results 
 Using a logistic regression and clustering at the qada (district)12 level produces the 
results in Figures 22-29 below13.  I ran separate regressions for confidence in Coalition 
Forces, the Iraqi Government, Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army, and the Armed National Opposition 
(insurgency), omitting the “Mixed Arab” community variable for each.  The Mixed Arab 
community represents 18% of the respondent population, and their confidence levels appear 
to represent the most moderate of all of the communities.  With each confidence model I 
created four sub-models to control for various internal and external characteristics.  The first 
sub-model covers all waves and all communities, with no restrictions.  In the second model, I 
limited the regression to only those qadas in which the Sunni Arab community represented 
the highest percentage of the respondent population, since Sunnis made up the majority of 
the violent insurgency in Iraq.  There were four of these qadas in Salahadin Province (Tikrit, 
Samarra, Ad-Daur, and As-Shirqat), two in Anbar Province (Fallujah and Ramadi), one in 
Diyala Province (Al-Muqdadiyah), three in Ninewa Province (Mosul, Tal Afar, and Al-
Hatra), and two in Ta’mim Province (Kirkuk and Al-Hawija).  I limited the third sub-model 
to Baghdad only, which included all survey respondents in the first half of the waves, and 
just those living in Baghdad from the second half of the waves.  Finally, I limited the fourth 
sub-model to the second half of the waves, which would include a nationwide sample of 
respondents during the same period of time, excluding the Baghdad-only first set of waves 
 
                                                        
12 Results of the four-wave model clustered at the province level supported these results.   
 
13 Full regression tables for both qada level and province level models are included in Appendix A. 
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Confidence in Coalition Forces14 
 The results of these models give only partial support for H1a, as access to essential 
services is predictive on an inconsistent basis, and no particular service proves uniformly 
predictive.  Unemployment proves insignificant to all but the Sunni Arab communities, 
offering very limited support for H2a.  The most consistent predictor of confidence in 
Coalition Forces is a positive perception of security over the three months prior to the survey, 
offering strong support for H3a.   The level of attacks in respondents’ qada in the previous 
month proves negative and significant for all but the Sunni Arab qadas, providing support for 
H4a.  
 Among the demographic characteristics, the respondents’ community appears to have 
some predictive power when compared to the moderate Mixed Arab community.   
Controlling for all of the other variables, Sunni Arabs are highly likely to lack confidence in 
Coalition forces in two out of three models including community variables, while the Kurds 
and the minority “Other” category are likely to have confidence in Coalition Forces in two 
                                                        
14 The inclusion of dummy variables for wave month did not affect the substantive findings 
throughout Test I, so I have omitted those variables for each of the confidence models.   
 
Figure 22: Test I Regression Results - Coalition Forces 
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out of three.  The predictive power of the Shia Arab community is not as strong, appearing in 
only one of the models, but in the positive direction.   
 
Confidence in the Iraqi Government 
 As with the Coalition Forces models, these models offer only partial support for H1a, 
since the relationship of the various essential services is significant in some models and 
insignificant in others.  Access to vehicle gas is the most consistent, proving significant in all 
four models.  H2a (unemployment) and H4a (attacks) receive a great deal of support in these 
models, registering insignificant only in the Sunni Arab model.   Like the previous set of 
models, perception of security is significant in the positive direction in all four models here, 
giving additional support to H3a.  The demographic characteristics appear to have a greater 
impact in this model, especially the Shia Arab and Sunni Arab communities and being male.   
 
Figure 23: Test I Regression Results - Iraqi Government 
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Confidence in the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army 
 
 The results of these two model sets are remarkably similar to each other, and they 
support the same substantive findings as the Iraqi Government model set.  
 
Figure 24: Test I Regression Results - Iraqi Police 
Figure 25: Test I Regression Results - Iraqi Army 
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Confidence in the Armed National Opposition 
 These models did not offer the same level of support for our hypotheses as the 
previous models.  Access to essential services, unemployment, and attacks in the previous 
month appear to have little bearing on one’s confidence in the insurgency, as these turn up 
consistently insignificant.  The only possible exceptions are access to cooking fuel and 
vehicle gas for the Sunni Arab qadas, and the perception of security for the Sunni qadas and 
the all-inclusive first model.  Demographic characteristics seem to be the best predictors, and 
they generally fall in the opposite direction as the previous models.  
 Because the preceding models predicting confidence in the insurgency did not 
produce the hypothesized results, and because our earlier cross-tabulation showed a portion 
of the population had confidence in both the insurgency and the Iraqi counterinsurgent forces 
(government, police, and army), I extended this test further.  This time, I included confidence 
in the Iraqi counterinsurgent forces as an independent variable to predict confidence in the 
insurgency, while controlling for the same demographic variables and counterinsurgency 
Lines of Effort as the rest of the Test I models.  The results of these new models are shown 
below in Figures 27 through 29.     
Figure 26: Test I Regression Results - Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) 
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Figure 27: Test Ia Regression Results - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government 
Figure 28: Test Ia Regression Results - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police 
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In these model sets, unemployment is a poor predictor of confidence in the 
insurgency across the board, while essential services are once again only significant for the 
Sunni Arab qadas.  Perceptions of security are only predictive in four of the twelve models 
above.  The most consistent and significant predictors of confidence in the insurgency appear 
to be confidence in the Iraqi government and Iraqi Army, both in the negative direction.  
Confidence in the Iraqi Police is also a significant predictor in two of the four models, and 
also in the negative direction.  
 
Test I Discussion 
Essential Services 
 Test I provides only partial support for the overall hypothesis that reported access to 
essential services predicts confidence in the counterinsurgent force.  I propose two reasons 
this could be the case.  First, the Iraqi population may have grievances with all or part of the 
counterinsurgent force that have nothing to do with their access to essential services.   If they 
Figure 29: Test Ia Regression Results - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army 
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view the Coalition Forces as occupiers with a questionable agenda, or if they view the Iraqi 
Government and Iraqi Security Forces (including the Police and Army) as inherently corrupt, 
it may take more than an increase in access to essential services to build their confidence in 
the counterinsurgent forces.   Second, it is likely that access to essential services is not 
randomly distributed throughout Iraq, which could affect the regression model.  Perhaps 
those with greater income or family connections could gain access to essential services on 
their own, which would likely have no effect on their confidence levels in other institutions.   
 Access to essential services appears to have little power in predicting confidence in 
the insurgency.  The only indication that it might have an impact is in the Sunni qadas, and 
that is limited to cooking fuel and vehicle gas.  It is certainly possible that backing for the 
Iraqi insurgency may be more tied to ideological, nationalist, sectarian, or other loyalty than 
to grievances from a lack of essential services.  In any case, it seems clear from these results 
that while increasing access to essential services may increase confidence in the 
counterinsurgent forces in certain cases, doing so is guaranteed to decrease confidence levels 
in the insurgency.   
 
Unemployment 
 The only groups for which unemployment is a significant predictor, in the negative 
direction, are the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Police.  The first finding is not altogether 
surprising, given that the population is more likely to hold the government responsible for the 
creation of jobs than any of the armed forces.  The second finding is still significant in the 
direction we would expect, but it is not clear why unemployment is a negative predictor of 
confidence for the Iraqi Police but not the Iraqi Army or Coalition Forces.  It is possible that 
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the population views the Ministry of the Interior (under which the Iraqi Police falls) as a 
closer arm of the national government than the Ministry of Defense (under which the Iraqi 
Army falls), and thus more responsible for job creation.  Another possibility is that the Iraqi 
Police may have more stringent or exclusive hiring practices that have caused the 
unemployed among the population to lose confidence in them.  Based upon these results, it is 
possible that increasing jobs for the Iraqi population would increase their confidence in the 
Iraqi Government and Iraqi Police.  However, these results would suggest that creating more 
jobs for Iraqis would not necessarily decrease their confidence in the insurgents.  
 
Security 
 By far the most consistent predictor of confidence in the counterinsurgent forces is 
respondents’ perception of security in their neighborhood over the three months prior to the 
survey.  This is the only finding that remains true for confidence in Coalition Forces, the 
Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi Army.  What this tells us is that people want 
safety for themselves and their loved ones, and assurance of this will cause them to have 
more confidence in those whose stated duty is to protect them.  What this does not tell us is 
how those particular areas became safe in the first place.  I have noted above that winning 
over the population may encourage them to provide military intelligence to 
counterinsurgents, which could lead to greater security, but the findings in Test I would seem 
to suggest the reverse – that creating secure conditions is the best way to win over the 
population.  Indeed, FM 3-24 stresses that creating a secure environment is the first and most 
important step, since the imminent threat of violence tends to be a deterrent to creating 
 55 
governance, establishing a working economy, delivering essential services, and the like 
(United States 2006).   
 Perhaps a more intriguing finding is that the perception of security is an insignificant 
predictor of confidence in the insurgency, except in the Sunni qadas.  One might assume that 
where feelings of security are low, the population would lose confidence in the insurgency, 
but it seems that the population is more likely to hold the counterinsurgent forces responsible 
for their perceptions of security than the insurgents.   
 
Prior Attacks 
 Coming in right behind perceptions of security, the level of attacks in one’s qada 
(district) the month prior to the survey is the second-most consistent non-demographic 
predictor of confidence in the counterinsurgent forces.  The relationship is negative and 
significant in the majority of the models above, meaning that when attacks in the previous 
month are higher, respondents are less likely to have confidence in the counterinsurgent 
forces.  One might expect prior attacks to be a less consistent predictor of respondents’ 
confidence than the respondents’ perception of security, as perceptions may not always 
mirror reality, but this finding shows that perception and reality for the Iraqi respondent were 
not far off.  Nevertheless, the results further support the previous finding that security 
appears to be the most important issue determining confidence in counterinsurgent forces.   
Similar to the findings above, the level of attacks from the prior month does not accurately 
predict one’s confidence level in the insurgency.      
 
Community 
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 Another relatively consistent predictor of one’s confidence in both the 
counterinsurgent forces and the insurgency is one’s ethno-religious community.  While the 
Shia Arab community variable does not significantly predict confidence in Coalition Forces, 
it does consistently predict confidence in the Shia Arab-dominated Iraqi Government, Iraqi 
Police, and Iraqi Army, while being a negative predictor of confidence in the Sunni Arab-
dominated insurgency.  These findings are not surprising, if one considers that Shia Arabs 
could be very optimistic about an Iraq in which their ethno-religious community dominates 
the government and security forces after many years of exclusion under the Ba’athist regime.  
The insignificant finding relating to confidence in the Coalition Forces could reflect a 
combination of gratitude for ousting the Ba’athist regime along with strong distrust for the 
intentions of Coalition Forces, the latter of which was fomented by Shia leaders such as 
Muqtada al-Sadr (Bapat 2005).  The Shia Arabs’ lack of confidence in the Sunni Arab-
dominated insurgency is also relatively intuitive, as they likely viewed the insurgency as a 
threat to their newfound dominance in the Iraqi government and security forces.   
On the other side, the Sunni Arab community variable predicts a lack of confidence in 
all four counterinsurgent forces, while predicting confidence in the insurgency.  None of 
these findings are surprising either, for the same reasons listed above – except in the opposite 
direction.  The Sunni Arabs, as a minority sect in Iraq, may lack confidence in all of the 
counterinsurgent forces because they quickly lost power after the fall of the Ba’athist regime 
and they do not trust a regime that does not represent their interests.  Marginalization of 
minorities can lead to low levels of legitimacy (Spencer 1991, Lipset 1994), making the 
success of other Lines of Effort that much more difficult.   
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The Kurdish community variable predicts that one will have confidence in the 
Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi Army, and it predicts that one will lack 
confidence in the insurgency, but it is an insignificant predictor of confidence in the Iraqi 
Government.  The traditionally strong relationship between the Kurdish people and the 
United States makes the first finding rather intuitive, and the majority presence of fellow 
Kurds in the Iraqi security forces in the Kurdish regions is likely responsible for the second 
two findings.  As for confidence in the Iraqi Government, the Kurds are probably torn 
between feelings of relief that the Ba’athist regime no longer excludes them from power 
entirely and feelings of caution because their minority status may mean they will continue to 
be marginalized in the new government.   
 
 
TEST II 
Dependent Variable 
 For the second test, the dependent variable is the number of attacks in a given qada-
month for one set of models, and the percentage of total attacks in a given qada-month for 
the second set.  Since attacks against civilians are likely more indicative of a terrorist attack, 
versus an insurgent attack, I will use the “sig1” variable for this model, which contains the 
count for all attacks that could be positively identified against a military target, including 
Coalition Forces, Iraqi Police, and Iraqi Army elements.  I once again took the natural log of 
the attacks in the first set of models to give a more normal distribution of the error term, and I 
used attack data from the month after the survey was taken, giving us the variable 
“f1.ln_sig1”.   
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Independent Variables 
 Inherently, what we want to test is whether or not a lack of confidence in the 
counterinsurgent forces in a particular area, in a particular month, can predict a higher level 
of attacks in that area in the next month, so for these models I collapsed the confidence 
variables to their means by qada and month.  I will also include the qada-month means for 
access to essential services, unemployment, perceptions of security, confidence in each of the 
counterinsurgent forces, confidence in the insurgency, and respondent community in these 
models to test their effects.  Finally, I will include several time variables in the regression to 
control for time effects.   
 
Test II Hypotheses 
*H5a:  In qada-months where confidence in Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Government, Iraqi 
Police, and Iraqi Army are greater, the following month will see fewer attacks in the same 
qada (negative and significant relationship).   
*H5b: In qada-months where confidence in the Armed National Insurgency is greater, the 
following month will see more attacks in the same qada (positive and significant 
relationship).    
*H6: In qada-months where individuals have greater access to clean drinking water, cooking 
fuel (propane), vehicle gas, and electricity on average, the following month will see less 
attacks in the same qada (negative and significant relationship).   
*H7: In qada-months where individuals have a lower unemployment average, the following 
month will see less attacks in the same qada (positive and significant relationship).   
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*H8: In qada-months where the average perception of security is higher, the following month 
will see less attacks in the same qada (negative and significant relationship).   
 
Test II Results 
Predicting the Number of Future Attacks per Qada-Month  
Using a cross-sectional time-series regression with fixed effects produces the results 
shown in Figures 30 through 34 below.15  The clear trend shown in each of these five sets of 
models is the lack of significance of any variable other than time; in fact, the only variable 
other than time that registers significance is Confidence in the Armed National Opposition 
(insurgency), and that only occurs in one of the models.  These results offer no support for 
H5a, H5b, H6, H7, or H8.  
 
 
                                                        
15 Full regression tables are included in the Appendix. 
Figure 30: Test II Regression Results – Number of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces 
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Figure 31: Test II Regression Results - Number of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government 
 
Figure 32: Test II Regression Results - Number of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police 
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Figure 34: Test II Regression Results – Number of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Insurgency 
Figure 33: Test II Regression Results - Number of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army 
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Predicting the Percentage of Total Future Attacks per Qada-Month 
 The next group of models predicts the percentage of the total future attacks per qada-
month, a slightly different measure for attacks than the previous models that predicted the 
future number (count) of attacks per qada-month.  Regression results are shown below in 
Figures 35 through 39.  Fortunately, the time variables do not cancel out all of the other 
variables in these models, although they remain significant throughout, but there is again 
very little support for our hypotheses from the other variables.  One possible exception to this 
is unemployment (H7), which is a positive and significant predictor for percentage of total 
attacks in half of the models below.  Access to electricity is significant in only a few of the 
sub-models within the Baghdad-only set, but not consistently enough to give partial support 
to H6.  And while confidence in Coalition Forces is not a significant predictor, confidence in 
the Iraqi Government is significant in half of the models, and confidence in the Iraqi Police 
and Iraqi Army is significant in three out of four.  In each of these cases the relationship with 
attacks is positive, in the opposite direction I predicted in H5a.  Confidence in the insurgency 
is not consistently predictive in the models, as it is only significant in two of the models and 
those are in opposite directions.  Perceptions of security (H8) do not carry the same 
predictive power as in the models predicting respondent confidence, but it is still significant 
in several of the models below.  The only other variables that are significant in any of the 
models are the Shia Arab and Sunni Arab community variables, but again these do not appear 
consistently enough to be considered good predictors.   
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Figure 35: Test II Regression Results - % of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces 
Figure 36: Test II Regression Results - % of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government 
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Figure 37: Test II Regression Results - % of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police 
Figure 38: Test I Regression Results - % of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army 
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Test II Discussion 
Predicting the Number of Future Attacks per Qada-Month  
 One of the weaknesses of attempting to predict attacks in a certain area from 
respondent characteristics and survey responses is the necessary assumption that the residents 
will have some level of control over the number of attacks in their qada – either as ones who 
resort to (or resist the draw of) violence themselves, or as ones who have the power to 
facilitate or thwart attacks with passive support to either side.  The former case relies on 
related assumptions that if residents conduct attacks, they would do so in their own qadas, 
and in the following month.  If the null impacts of qada-internal variables from these models 
are accurate, however, it suggests that attacks are a function of either different or external 
variables not addressed in this study.  It may further suggest that insurgents conduct attacks 
arbitrarily in qadas not their own, and that residents are either powerless or unwilling to 
thwart the attacks themselves by active or passive means.          
Predicting the Percentage of Total Future Attacks per Qada-Month  
Figure 39: Test II Regression Results - % of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Insurgency 
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 If models predicting the percentage of attacks are more accurate than the models 
predicting the number of attacks, it would suggest that attacks are less arbitrary and could 
potentially be tied to variables internal to the qada in which attacks occur.  
Confidence 
Hypotheses H5a and H5b were based on the assumption that residents have some 
level of control over the occurrence of attacks in their qadas, either as active or passive 
participants.  I took an additional step to assume that confidence in one side or the other 
would cause residents to actively or passively support one side or the other when it came to 
attacks, but it appears from the results here that residents may not have as much control over 
the occurrence of attacks as I assumed.  The results showing a positive and significant 
relationship between confidence in counterinsurgent forces and future attacks further suggest 
that insurgent attacks are not completely arbitrary; insurgents may in fact be targeting 
districts or individuals with high levels of confidence in the counterinsurgent forces as a 
punitive measure or as a warning to others.   
Essential Services and Unemployment   
The null findings concerning essential services fail to confirm the Berman, et al. 
(Draft 2009) finding that increasing access to essential services in a particular area will 
necessarily reduce attacks.  The finding of partial support for unemployment as a predictor of 
attacks runs contrary to the finding of Berman, et al. (2009), although there may be other 
factors involved.  For instance, it is possible that a rural area with high unemployment could 
also be an area highly conducive to covert attacks due to its terrain and low volume of traffic.  
Given these potential discrepancies in academic research to date, further research is required 
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to determine the true impact of essential service delivery and unemployment upon attacks in 
a given area. 
Security 
 Perceptions of security do not have the same predictive power in Test II as they did in 
Test I.  This null finding may be evidence of the uncertainty typical in an insurgency, as it 
did not appear that areas in which respondents perceived their area as secure necessarily 
predicted a low percentage of attacks in the following month, nor did it necessarily predict a 
higher percentage of attacks for areas in which respondents perceived their area as less 
secure.  This should serve as a warning against complacency for counterinsurgent forces. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this article I have described various insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies 
before narrowing my focus to the U.S. military’s current counterinsurgency strategy, a 
population-centered approach that hangs upon the concept of building legitimacy for the 
counterinsurgent regime.  My purpose throughout was to test the effects of this strategy as 
implemented in Iraq from 2004-2006, with the goal of providing feedback for future 
counterinsurgency strategy formulation and implementation.   
Clearly, individuals’ perceptions of security are the most predictive of confidence in 
the counterinsurgent forces, including Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Government, Iraqi Police, 
and Iraqi Army.  Although most counterinsurgent forces are well aware of their duty to 
protect the population at-large, the findings in Test I should give added emphasis and 
urgency to the task of securing the population.  By contrast, perceptions of security in a 
particular qada (district) do not appear to be consistently predictive of attacks in that qada 
the following month, given the results of Test II.  This finding is potentially indicative of 
insurgents’ agency, of residents’ relative inability or unwillingness to control violence where 
they live, and of the uncertain environment following a regime change.   
With only partial support for the positive effects of access to essential services on 
respondents’ confidence in counterinsurgent forces, it is safe to say that simply increasing the 
delivery of essential services is not enough to gain the confidence of the people.  Individuals 
may have other subjective grievances or doubts about the regime that essential services fail to 
address, so it is incumbent upon the counterinsurgent forces to determine the true source of 
grievances.  Nonetheless, increasing the delivery of essential services demonstrates objective 
effectiveness at meeting particular needs of the population, and the population may also see it 
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as a gesture of good will.  Of particular note, access to cooking fuel and access to vehicle gas 
are negative predictors of confidence in the insurgency in the Sunni qadas, but this finding is 
inconsistent across the rest of Iraq.  As with the delivery of essential services, increasing 
employment may not be enough to gain the confidence of the people outright, but 
counterinsurgents would still be wise to address this issue after establishing security.   
The power of one’s ethno-religious community in predicting his confidence in the 
counterinsurgent forces and the insurgency should be a poignant reminder for 
counterinsurgents to understand the historical and cultural context in which they operate.  
While hindsight tends to be near-perfect, it does not seem a stretch to realize that establishing 
a representative democracy in Iraq would strongly favor the Shia Arab majority while 
stripping the Sunni Arab minority of considerable power.  This spurned minority, many of 
whom nonetheless despised the previous Ba’athist regime, could not have been expected to 
accept this forfeiture of power without a fight.  For individuals in this position, it is not hard 
to imagine that security, essential services, and employment would not satisfy them entirely.  
U.S. policy makers and military strategists should strongly consider the historical and 
cultural context of any given region prior to military invasion with the purpose of regime 
change.   
One final point of consideration from these findings: at the margins, it does not 
appear that there was a legitimacy tug-of-war between the insurgents and counterinsurgents, 
such that legitimacy gains by one side meant legitimacy losses for the other.  The issue of 
support for insurgents or counterinsurgents in Iraq is complex, and it does not appear to boil 
down to “who can best meet my needs.”  Once again, this requires counterinsurgents to 
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understand the specific grievances of the insurgents and the “neutral” population, as well as 
competing loyalties, and to modify their strategy accordingly.    
I have highlighted some of the weaknesses of this study throughout, and I reiterate 
them here.  First of all, this study does not constitute a comprehensive review of U.S. military 
counterinsurgency doctrine, as it only tests three of the seven prescribed Lines of Effort: 
Establish Civil Security, Restore Essential Services, and Support to Economic and 
Infrastructure Development.  Furthermore, this study only addresses the employment portion 
of Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development.  As another weakness, I have 
operationalized and analyzed three Lines of Effort separate from the other four, but the Lines 
of Effort from U.S. military doctrine are meant to work together as a mutually supporting 
counterinsurgency framework.  Future research should test the additional four Lines of Effort 
(Establish Civil Control, Support Host Nation Security Forces, Support to Governance, and 
Conduct Information Engagement) in concert with the three I tested here.  Additionally, the 
findings of this study are only as reliable as the data itself.  The director of IIACSS could not 
say with complete confidence that the survey data collected by his organization was error-
free, which could cast some doubt upon the statistical results.  And finally, without accurate 
population statistics for qadas or the geographic size of the qadas, I was not able to control 
for either of those variables when predicting attacks.   
Much has changed in Iraq since September 2006.  Future studies in Iraq might 
analyze more recent survey and attack data to see if the same trends found here continue to 
emerge.  Of particular interest would be the time frame of the troop surge in Iraq from 2007-
2009, and the perceptible momentum change in favor of the counterinsurgents during that 
period.   
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APPENDIX A: TEST I REGRESSION TABLES 
 
Table 1: Predicting Confidence in Coalition Forces - All Communities, All Waves 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_CF conf_CF conf_CF conf_CF conf_CF 
       
conf_CF male -0.0103 0.00190 -0.00935 -0.0152 0.0196 
  (0.0373) (0.0374) (0.0403) (0.0408) (0.0421) 
 over40 0.0542 0.0544 0.0449 0.0487 0.0143 
  (0.0481) (0.0467) (0.0455) (0.0444) (0.0439) 
 collgrad 0.111 0.111* 0.144** 0.153** 0.0669 
  (0.0681) (0.0656) (0.0629) (0.0599) (0.0540) 
 Shia_Arab 0.102 0.103 0.0687 -0.120 0.158 
  (0.191) (0.191) (0.182) (0.188) (0.137) 
 Sunni_Arab -0.965*** -0.969*** -0.860*** -0.836*** -0.421*** 
  (0.222) (0.221) (0.203) (0.183) (0.125) 
 Kurd 2.844*** 2.858*** 2.753*** 2.335*** 3.001*** 
  (0.379) (0.379) (0.350) (0.261) (0.240) 
 Other 0.469** 0.464** 0.489*** 0.438** 0.619*** 
  (0.207) (0.206) (0.189) (0.173) (0.134) 
 water 0.218** 0.213** 0.186** 0.182** 0.185*** 
  (0.0916) (0.0932) (0.0893) (0.0848) (0.0570) 
 cookfuel 0.0968 0.0969 0.0778 0.0622 0.0323 
  (0.0658) (0.0639) (0.0565) (0.0562) (0.0636) 
 gas 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.404*** 0.421*** 0.285*** 
  (0.0887) (0.0886) (0.0842) (0.0861) (0.0742) 
 elec 0.246** 0.236* 0.254** 0.227* 0.146 
  (0.122) (0.124) (0.102) (0.118) (0.148) 
 unemployed  -0.0960 -0.120* -0.127* -0.103* 
   (0.0647) (0.0681) (0.0658) (0.0565) 
 security   0.870*** 0.796*** 0.739*** 
    (0.104) (0.0989) (0.113) 
 l1_ln_sigact    -0.160** -0.228*** 
     (0.0642) (0.0639) 
 537b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 540.yrmo     0.406 
      (0.250) 
 541.yrmo     0.864*** 
      (0.221) 
 542.yrmo     0.543** 
      (0.247) 
 543.yrmo     0.271* 
      (0.143) 
 544.yrmo     0.0814 
      (0.190) 
 545.yrmo     0.217 
      (0.135) 
 546.yrmo     -0.0536 
      (0.296) 
 547.yrmo     -0.170 
      (0.242) 
 548.yrmo     -0.0796 
      (0.179) 
 553.yrmo     -1.066*** 
      (0.241) 
 554.yrmo     -0.729** 
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      (0.297) 
 555.yrmo     -1.154** 
      (0.488) 
 556.yrmo     -0.741** 
      (0.298) 
 557.yrmo     -0.713** 
      (0.290) 
 558.yrmo     -0.734** 
      (0.300) 
 559.yrmo     -0.373 
      (0.342) 
 560.yrmo     -0.567* 
      (0.320) 
 Constant -2.703*** -2.696*** -2.849*** -2.226*** -2.014*** 
  (0.124) (0.123) (0.125) (0.277) (0.339) 
       
 Observations 90,199 89,755 88,534 88,534 88,534 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2: Predicting Confidence in Coalition Forces - Four-Model Comparison 
  All Sunni qadas Baghdad Nationwide 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_CF conf_CF conf_CF conf_CF 
      
conf_CF male -0.0152 -0.116 -0.0403 0.0532 
  (0.0408) (0.0860) (0.0668) (0.0362) 
 over40 0.0487 -0.151 0.0594 -0.00731 
  (0.0444) (0.137) (0.0584) (0.0644) 
 collgrad 0.153** 0.321*** 0.108** 0.0389 
  (0.0599) (0.115) (0.0528) (0.114) 
 Shia_Arab -0.120  0.187 -0.322 
  (0.188)  (0.125) (0.283) 
 Sunni_Arab -0.836***  -0.646*** -0.499 
  (0.183)  (0.117) (0.325) 
 Kurd 2.335***  -0.467 2.554*** 
  (0.261)  (0.381) (0.274) 
 Other 0.438**  0.489*** 0.497 
  (0.173)  (0.130) (0.355) 
 water 0.182** 0.630* 0.125** 0.292*** 
  (0.0848) (0.342) (0.0494) (0.0815) 
 cookfuel 0.0622 0.481 0.104** -0.0352 
  (0.0562) (0.373) (0.0411) (0.129) 
 gas 0.421*** 0.253 0.142** 0.360*** 
  (0.0861) (0.273) (0.0570) (0.125) 
 elec 0.227* 0.666*** 0.112 0.237 
  (0.118) (0.0641) (0.113) (0.206) 
 unemployed -0.127* -0.467** -0.0184 -0.108 
  (0.0658) (0.200) (0.0675) (0.0992) 
 security 0.796*** 2.211*** 0.713*** 0.832*** 
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  (0.0989) (0.214) (0.101) (0.166) 
 l1_ln_sigact -0.160** -0.00973 -0.142** -0.261*** 
  (0.0642) (0.163) (0.0613) (0.0853) 
 Constant -2.226*** -3.850*** -2.077*** -2.414*** 
  (0.277) (0.510) (0.270) (0.366) 
      
 Observations 88,534 12,102 49,061 51,745 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 3: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Government - All Communities, All Waves 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_gov conf_gov conf_gov conf_gov conf_gov 
       
conf_gov male -0.294*** -0.282*** -0.295*** -0.296*** -0.276*** 
  (0.0451) (0.0442) (0.0464) (0.0466) (0.0477) 
 over40 0.171*** 0.169*** 0.157*** 0.160*** 0.124*** 
  (0.0287) (0.0290) (0.0284) (0.0294) (0.0261) 
 collgrad -0.0413 -0.0403 -0.0218 -0.0211 -0.0993** 
  (0.0657) (0.0655) (0.0648) (0.0637) (0.0441) 
 Shia_Arab 0.666*** 0.665*** 0.632*** 0.479*** 0.796*** 
  (0.116) (0.116) (0.105) (0.102) (0.108) 
 Sunni_Arab -1.718*** -1.720*** -1.644*** -1.617*** -1.316*** 
  (0.368) (0.367) (0.358) (0.338) (0.277) 
 Kurd 0.262** 0.249** 0.0173 -0.351 0.255 
  (0.113) (0.115) (0.107) (0.214) (0.187) 
 Other -0.339 -0.345 -0.336 -0.377 -0.179 
  (0.360) (0.361) (0.353) (0.336) (0.250) 
 water 0.124 0.123 0.104 0.117 0.0626 
  (0.0845) (0.0849) (0.0832) (0.0774) (0.0661) 
 cookfuel 0.347*** 0.348*** 0.318*** 0.287*** 0.248*** 
  (0.0733) (0.0728) (0.0732) (0.0744) (0.0634) 
 gas 0.509*** 0.508*** 0.434*** 0.439*** 0.297*** 
  (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0807) (0.0811) (0.0772) 
 elec 0.122 0.128 0.121 0.0777 0.000297 
  (0.0915) (0.0900) (0.0919) (0.103) (0.109) 
 unemployed  -0.140** -0.155*** -0.162*** -0.174*** 
   (0.0583) (0.0534) (0.0560) (0.0544) 
 security   1.397*** 1.330*** 1.188*** 
    (0.128) (0.113) (0.104) 
 l1_ln_sigact    -0.141** -0.132** 
     (0.0562) (0.0515) 
 537b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 540.yrmo     0.639*** 
      (0.131) 
 541.yrmo     1.134*** 
      (0.114) 
 542.yrmo     0.614*** 
      (0.163) 
 543.yrmo     0.146 
      (0.148) 
 544.yrmo     0.210* 
      (0.111) 
 545.yrmo     -0.116 
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      (0.241) 
 546.yrmo     -0.0606 
      (0.170) 
 547.yrmo     -0.229 
      (0.140) 
 548.yrmo     -0.444** 
      (0.188) 
 553.yrmo     -0.474*** 
      (0.182) 
 554.yrmo     -0.360* 
      (0.205) 
 555.yrmo     -0.580*** 
      (0.203) 
 556.yrmo     -0.421** 
      (0.180) 
 557.yrmo     -0.450** 
      (0.202) 
 558.yrmo     -0.653*** 
      (0.200) 
 559.yrmo     -0.791*** 
      (0.161) 
 560.yrmo     -0.863*** 
      (0.202) 
 Constant 0.846*** 0.855*** 0.731*** 1.286*** 1.379*** 
  (0.113) (0.114) (0.116) (0.240) (0.300) 
       
 Observations 87,140 86,751 85,624 85,624 85,624 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 4: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Government - Four-Model Comparison 
  All Sunni qadas Baghdad Nationwide 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_gov conf_gov conf_gov conf_gov 
      
conf_gov male -0.296*** -0.614*** -0.141*** -0.384*** 
  (0.0466) (0.115) (0.0404) (0.0534) 
 over40 0.160*** 0.0764* 0.0911*** 0.108*** 
  (0.0294) (0.0449) (0.0327) (0.0406) 
 collgrad -0.0211 -0.0305 -0.213*** -0.0480 
  (0.0637) (0.125) (0.0399) (0.0874) 
 Shia_Arab 0.479***  0.526*** 0.780*** 
  (0.102)  (0.111) (0.142) 
 Sunni_Arab -1.617***  -0.577*** -2.132*** 
  (0.338)  (0.0778) (0.396) 
 Kurd -0.351  0.690*** -0.0320 
  (0.214)  (0.162) (0.213) 
 Other -0.377  0.224* -0.618 
  (0.336)  (0.122) (0.385) 
 water 0.117 0.903*** 0.210** 0.0540 
  (0.0774) (0.337) (0.0957) (0.0756) 
 cookfuel 0.287*** -0.372** 0.129 0.0767 
  (0.0744) (0.173) (0.0876) (0.105) 
 gas 0.439*** 0.599*** 0.285*** 0.335** 
  (0.0811) (0.163) (0.0563) (0.162) 
 elec 0.0777 0.978** -0.0916 0.0861 
  (0.103) (0.440) (0.0876) (0.152) 
 unemployed -0.162*** -0.190 -0.202*** -0.198*** 
  (0.0560) (0.254) (0.0730) (0.0746) 
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 security 1.330*** 3.322*** 1.068*** 1.435*** 
  (0.113) (0.416) (0.113) (0.169) 
 l1_ln_sigact -0.141** -0.232 -0.109** -0.120** 
  (0.0562) (0.242) (0.0481) (0.0568) 
 Constant 1.286*** -1.302 1.279*** 1.080*** 
  (0.240) (0.895) (0.289) (0.229) 
      
 Observations 85,624 11,482 47,028 50,395 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Police - All Communities, All Waves 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_IP conf_IP conf_IP conf_IP conf_IP 
       
conf_IP male -0.336*** -0.318*** -0.328*** -0.321*** -0.312*** 
  (0.0384) (0.0361) (0.0365) (0.0326) (0.0320) 
 over40 0.0481* 0.0459 0.0384 0.0387 0.0280 
  (0.0285) (0.0287) (0.0300) (0.0307) (0.0253) 
 collgrad -0.251*** -0.252*** -0.251*** -0.264*** -0.282*** 
  (0.0697) (0.0696) (0.0697) (0.0750) (0.0596) 
 Shia_Arab 0.915*** 0.916*** 0.898*** 0.623*** 0.751*** 
  (0.149) (0.148) (0.139) (0.141) (0.163) 
 Sunni_Arab -1.122*** -1.123*** -1.047*** -1.004*** -0.858*** 
  (0.315) (0.314) (0.309) (0.292) (0.272) 
 Kurd 1.615*** 1.613*** 1.498*** 0.840*** 1.002*** 
  (0.247) (0.250) (0.239) (0.240) (0.250) 
 Other 0.235 0.234 0.252 0.183 0.272 
  (0.285) (0.285) (0.274) (0.261) (0.236) 
 water 0.0619 0.0597 0.0423 0.0725 0.101 
  (0.0718) (0.0717) (0.0699) (0.0632) (0.0625) 
 cookfuel 0.391*** 0.393*** 0.365*** 0.322*** 0.274*** 
  (0.0638) (0.0640) (0.0624) (0.0613) (0.0595) 
 gas 0.294*** 0.296*** 0.241*** 0.249*** 0.199*** 
  (0.0901) (0.0902) (0.0868) (0.0861) (0.0709) 
 elec -0.0151 -0.0140 -0.0282 -0.117 0.0116 
  (0.114) (0.113) (0.119) (0.133) (0.126) 
 unemployed  -0.181*** -0.193*** -0.205*** -0.204*** 
   (0.0599) (0.0585) (0.0557) (0.0564) 
 security   1.028*** 0.921*** 0.865*** 
    (0.127) (0.120) (0.102) 
 l1_ln_sigact    -0.273*** -0.281*** 
     (0.0604) (0.0599) 
 537b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 540.yrmo     0.308** 
      (0.136) 
 541.yrmo     0.884*** 
      (0.158) 
 542.yrmo     0.728*** 
      (0.233) 
 543.yrmo     0.475** 
      (0.196) 
 544.yrmo     0.406** 
      (0.192) 
 545.yrmo     0.550*** 
      (0.173) 
 546.yrmo     0.756*** 
      (0.191) 
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 547.yrmo     0.556*** 
      (0.143) 
 548.yrmo     0.457*** 
      (0.137) 
 553.yrmo     0.289 
      (0.193) 
 554.yrmo     0.388** 
      (0.189) 
 555.yrmo     0.266 
      (0.197) 
 556.yrmo     0.415** 
      (0.168) 
 557.yrmo     0.441** 
      (0.186) 
 558.yrmo     0.122 
      (0.242) 
 559.yrmo     0.180 
      (0.170) 
 560.yrmo     0.252 
      (0.189) 
 Constant 1.044*** 1.053*** 0.954*** 2.040*** 1.582*** 
  (0.153) (0.153) (0.155) (0.307) (0.298) 
       
 Observations 93,920 93,473 92,107 92,107 92,107 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 6: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Police - Four-Model Comparison 
  All Sunni qadas Baghdad Nationwide 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_IP conf_IP conf_IP conf_IP 
      
conf_IP male -0.321*** -0.465*** -0.252*** -0.358*** 
  (0.0326) (0.0546) (0.0253) (0.0455) 
 over40 0.0387 -0.0340 0.0628** -0.0201 
  (0.0307) (0.0821) (0.0284) (0.0370) 
 collgrad -0.264*** -0.338*** -0.269*** -0.209** 
  (0.0750) (0.0725) (0.0718) (0.106) 
 Shia_Arab 0.623***  0.563*** 1.070*** 
  (0.141)  (0.109) (0.270) 
 Sunni_Arab -1.004***  -0.867*** -0.902* 
  (0.292)  (0.130) (0.484) 
 Kurd 0.840***  0.701*** 0.998*** 
  (0.240)  (0.198) (0.366) 
 Other 0.183  0.486*** 0.253 
  (0.261)  (0.160) (0.372) 
 water 0.0725 0.240 0.0817 0.0208 
  (0.0632) (0.241) (0.0627) (0.0882) 
 cookfuel 0.322*** -0.192*** 0.279*** 0.0489 
  (0.0613) (0.0487) (0.0674) (0.121) 
 gas 0.249*** -0.101 0.253*** 0.0108 
  (0.0861) (0.0731) (0.0569) (0.146) 
 elec -0.117 -0.0227 -0.204 0.0233 
  (0.133) (0.447) (0.145) (0.188) 
 unemployed -0.205*** -0.206 -0.240*** -0.295*** 
  (0.0557) (0.171) (0.0600) (0.0914) 
 security 0.921*** 2.227*** 0.711*** 1.295*** 
  (0.120) (0.776) (0.0922) (0.164) 
 l1_ln_sigact -0.273*** -1.000*** -0.144** -0.341*** 
  (0.0604) (0.327) (0.0572) (0.0762) 
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 Constant 2.040*** 4.258*** 1.625*** 2.088*** 
  (0.307) (1.508) (0.276) (0.492) 
      
 Observations 92,107 12,041 51,582 53,164 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 7: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Army - All Communities, All Waves 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_IA conf_IA conf_IA conf_IA conf_IA 
       
conf_IA male -0.269*** -0.259*** -0.267*** -0.262*** -0.241*** 
  (0.0348) (0.0330) (0.0340) (0.0318) (0.0316) 
 over40 0.0952*** 0.0935*** 0.0852*** 0.0877*** 0.0651** 
  (0.0245) (0.0248) (0.0254) (0.0272) (0.0255) 
 collgrad -0.0906 -0.0903 -0.0825 -0.0887 -0.139** 
  (0.0734) (0.0728) (0.0737) (0.0786) (0.0692) 
 Shia_Arab 0.890*** 0.890*** 0.868*** 0.622*** 0.784*** 
  (0.165) (0.165) (0.155) (0.155) (0.177) 
 Sunni_Arab -1.597*** -1.597*** -1.521*** -1.489*** -1.303*** 
  (0.293) (0.292) (0.284) (0.264) (0.232) 
 Kurd 1.424*** 1.438*** 1.290*** 0.709*** 1.005*** 
  (0.267) (0.271) (0.254) (0.259) (0.244) 
 Other 0.172 0.169 0.188 0.131 0.243 
  (0.293) (0.292) (0.280) (0.266) (0.218) 
 water -0.0104 -0.0124 -0.0346 -0.0100 0.0136 
  (0.0827) (0.0832) (0.0819) (0.0749) (0.0719) 
 cookfuel 0.445*** 0.446*** 0.414*** 0.372*** 0.320*** 
  (0.0591) (0.0596) (0.0586) (0.0625) (0.0719) 
 gas 0.511*** 0.515*** 0.457*** 0.465*** 0.396*** 
  (0.105) (0.105) (0.102) (0.0995) (0.107) 
 elec 0.129 0.126 0.114 0.0419 0.0796 
  (0.102) (0.102) (0.109) (0.108) (0.122) 
 unemployed  -0.0927 -0.104 -0.114* -0.124* 
   (0.0682) (0.0670) (0.0674) (0.0718) 
 security   1.177*** 1.080*** 0.990*** 
    (0.119) (0.108) (0.0933) 
 l1_ln_sigact    -0.236*** -0.241*** 
     (0.0617) (0.0588) 
 537b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 540.yrmo     0.250 
      (0.211) 
 541.yrmo     0.769*** 
      (0.207) 
 542.yrmo     0.649*** 
      (0.245) 
 543.yrmo     0.153 
      (0.375) 
 544.yrmo     0.146 
      (0.317) 
 545.yrmo     0.259 
      (0.287) 
 546.yrmo     0.484** 
      (0.214) 
 547.yrmo     0.340* 
      (0.179) 
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 548.yrmo     0.348** 
      (0.177) 
 553.yrmo     -0.0160 
      (0.167) 
 554.yrmo     0.0236 
      (0.165) 
 555.yrmo     -0.118 
      (0.186) 
 556.yrmo     -0.192 
      (0.149) 
 557.yrmo     0.00147 
      (0.197) 
 558.yrmo     -0.109 
      (0.198) 
 559.yrmo     -0.107 
      (0.181) 
 560.yrmo     -0.132 
      (0.165) 
 Constant 0.932*** 0.935*** 0.824*** 1.762*** 1.568*** 
  (0.149) (0.149) (0.151) (0.294) (0.315) 
       
 Observations 91,979 91,549 90,209 90,209 90,209 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 8: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Army - Four-Model Comparison 
  All Sunni qadas Baghdad Nationwide 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_IA conf_IA conf_IA conf_IA 
      
conf_IA male -0.262*** -0.465*** -0.197*** -0.281*** 
  (0.0318) (0.0870) (0.0303) (0.0421) 
 over40 0.0877*** 0.000102 0.106*** 0.0146 
  (0.0272) (0.0464) (0.0366) (0.0272) 
 collgrad -0.0887 -0.187 -0.176* -0.00385 
  (0.0786) (0.147) (0.0946) (0.0948) 
 Shia_Arab 0.622***  0.580*** 1.016*** 
  (0.155)  (0.149) (0.237) 
 Sunni_Arab -1.489***  -1.007*** -1.580*** 
  (0.264)  (0.150) (0.407) 
 Kurd 0.709***  0.519*** 0.912*** 
  (0.259)  (0.130) (0.333) 
 Other 0.131  0.521*** 0.0515 
  (0.266)  (0.179) (0.315) 
 water -0.0100 0.340 -0.00407 -0.0374 
  (0.0749) (0.347) (0.0801) (0.0855) 
 cookfuel 0.372*** -0.0600 0.303*** 0.0452 
  (0.0625) (0.135) (0.0752) (0.0999) 
 gas 0.465*** 0.348 0.391*** 0.141 
  (0.0995) (0.367) (0.0721) (0.186) 
 elec 0.0419 0.314 -0.152 0.209 
  (0.108) (0.345) (0.119) (0.150) 
 unemployed -0.114* -0.0229 -0.117 -0.204** 
  (0.0674) (0.243) (0.0814) (0.103) 
 security 1.080*** 2.692*** 0.893*** 1.227*** 
  (0.108) (0.497) (0.101) (0.154) 
 l1_ln_sigact -0.236*** -0.547** -0.125* -0.286*** 
  (0.0617) (0.272) (0.0666) (0.0656) 
 Constant 1.762*** 1.280 1.457*** 1.737*** 
  (0.294) (1.081) (0.312) (0.397) 
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 Observations 90,209 12,046 49,975 52,723 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 9: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - All Communities, All Waves 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO 
       
conf_ANO male 0.168*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.162*** 0.174*** 
  (0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0294) (0.0297) (0.0283) 
 over40 -0.0655** -0.0657** -0.0644** -0.0635** -0.0713** 
  (0.0291) (0.0288) (0.0284) (0.0287) (0.0296) 
 collgrad -0.195*** -0.192*** -0.202*** -0.198*** -0.222*** 
  (0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0521) (0.0554) (0.0536) 
 Shia_Arab -0.833*** -0.832*** -0.822*** -0.746*** -0.672*** 
  (0.133) (0.134) (0.129) (0.126) (0.134) 
 Sunni_Arab 1.201*** 1.200*** 1.180*** 1.168*** 1.264*** 
  (0.232) (0.232) (0.226) (0.214) (0.205) 
 Kurd -1.232*** -1.240*** -1.182*** -0.969*** -0.753*** 
  (0.127) (0.127) (0.130) (0.235) (0.248) 
 Other -0.202 -0.202 -0.208 -0.178 -0.129 
  (0.172) (0.173) (0.169) (0.167) (0.185) 
 water 0.0697 0.0701 0.0828 0.0746 0.0768 
  (0.0570) (0.0565) (0.0561) (0.0577) (0.0524) 
 cookfuel -0.0674 -0.0669 -0.0627 -0.0556 -0.183*** 
  (0.0762) (0.0761) (0.0733) (0.0771) (0.0580) 
 gas -0.0299 -0.0298 -0.0177 -0.0196 -0.138 
  (0.109) (0.108) (0.106) (0.108) (0.0896) 
 elec 0.0600 0.0596 0.0595 0.0885 0.0179 
  (0.0811) (0.0797) (0.0796) (0.0863) (0.103) 
 unemployed  0.0261 0.0300 0.0292 0.0301 
   (0.0753) (0.0752) (0.0750) (0.0752) 
 security   -0.220*** -0.183** -0.215*** 
    (0.0847) (0.0829) (0.0799) 
 l1_ln_sigact    0.0751 0.0826 
     (0.0596) (0.0602) 
 537b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 540.yrmo     -0.141 
      (0.171) 
 541.yrmo     -0.330 
      (0.222) 
 542.yrmo     -0.261 
      (0.226) 
 543.yrmo     0.456** 
      (0.201) 
 544.yrmo     0.0702 
      (0.173) 
 545.yrmo     0.0721 
      (0.168) 
 546.yrmo     -0.0779 
      (0.101) 
 547.yrmo     -0.322** 
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      (0.144) 
 548.yrmo     -0.464*** 
      (0.138) 
 553.yrmo     -0.317* 
      (0.185) 
 554.yrmo     -0.560*** 
      (0.165) 
 557.yrmo     -0.158 
      (0.228) 
 558.yrmo     -0.329 
      (0.203) 
 559.yrmo     -0.296* 
      (0.172) 
 560.yrmo     -0.422** 
      (0.168) 
 Constant -0.710*** -0.711*** -0.682*** -0.980*** -0.798*** 
  (0.109) (0.108) (0.115) (0.251) (0.284) 
       
 Observations 64,098 63,864 63,121 63,121 63,121 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 10: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - Four-Model Comparison 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO 
      
conf_ANO male 0.162*** 0.0546 0.135*** 0.159** 
  (0.0297) (0.111) (0.0416) (0.0618) 
 over40 -0.0635** -0.0835 -0.0412 -0.0978*** 
  (0.0287) (0.0896) (0.0358) (0.0377) 
 collgrad -0.198*** 0.0635 -0.132*** -0.299*** 
  (0.0554) (0.0613) (0.0450) (0.112) 
 Shia_Arab -0.746***  -0.580*** -1.071*** 
  (0.126)  (0.0807) (0.353) 
 Sunni_Arab 1.168***  0.549*** 1.793*** 
  (0.214)  (0.144) (0.407) 
 Kurd -0.969***  -1.577*** -0.629 
  (0.235)  (0.323) (0.465) 
 Other -0.178  -0.389** 0.108 
  (0.167)  (0.191) (0.447) 
 water 0.0746 -0.464* 0.177*** 0.0455 
  (0.0577) (0.242) (0.0568) (0.0955) 
 cookfuel -0.0556 -0.434*** 0.0681 -0.131 
  (0.0771) (0.115) (0.0640) (0.108) 
 gas -0.0196 -1.048*** 0.0363 -0.329 
  (0.108) (0.183) (0.0925) (0.242) 
 elec 0.0885 -0.156 0.0118 0.155 
  (0.0863) (0.184) (0.0803) (0.173) 
 unemployed 0.0292 0.247 0.0710 0.125 
  (0.0750) (0.227) (0.0805) (0.119) 
 81 
 security -0.183** -1.891*** -0.0824 -0.166 
  (0.0829) (0.410) (0.0600) (0.177) 
 l1_ln_sigact 0.0751 0.0120 -0.0946* 0.102 
  (0.0596) (0.176) (0.0487) (0.0765) 
 Constant -0.980*** 1.458** -0.507** -1.262** 
  (0.251) (0.632) (0.237) (0.495) 
      
 Observations 63,121 7,754 38,601 32,501 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 11: Predicting Confidence in Coalition Forces - All Communities, All Waves (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province 
Cluster) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_CF conf_CF conf_CF conf_CF conf_CF 
       
conf_CF male 0.0560 0.0498 0.0333 0.0285 0.0235 
  (0.0758) (0.0749) (0.0811) (0.0806) (0.0755) 
 over40 -0.0221 -0.0223 -0.0120 0.0152 0.0163 
  (0.0738) (0.0710) (0.0664) (0.0610) (0.0598) 
 collgrad -0.0778 -0.0794 -0.0131 0.0286 0.0172 
  (0.181) (0.182) (0.183) (0.171) (0.171) 
 Shia_Arab 0.357** 0.351** 0.0249 -0.651 -0.681 
  (0.177) (0.178) (0.200) (0.434) (0.440) 
 Sunni_Arab -0.460 -0.470 -0.354 -0.622 -0.559 
  (0.436) (0.433) (0.398) (0.405) (0.391) 
 Kurd 3.966*** 3.964*** 3.629*** 2.781*** 2.752*** 
  (0.392) (0.391) (0.356) (0.275) (0.261) 
 Other 1.123*** 1.109*** 1.086*** 0.783*** 0.801*** 
  (0.297) (0.290) (0.284) (0.187) (0.195) 
 water 0.0679 0.0635 0.0102 -0.0183 0.0796 
  (0.133) (0.131) (0.125) (0.125) (0.136) 
 cookfuel 0.369*** 0.383*** 0.336*** 0.317*** 0.193 
  (0.109) (0.110) (0.103) (0.100) (0.126) 
 gas 0.443** 0.437** 0.404*** 0.407*** 0.460*** 
  (0.173) (0.173) (0.149) (0.138) (0.124) 
 elec -0.252 -0.253 -0.264* -0.214* -0.370*** 
  (0.184) (0.184) (0.157) (0.120) (0.129) 
 unemployed  -0.0214 -0.0365 -0.0692 -0.0743 
   (0.0871) (0.0854) (0.0900) (0.0899) 
 security   0.939*** 0.768*** 0.784*** 
    (0.187) (0.142) (0.126) 
 l1_ln_sigact    -0.206*** -0.221*** 
     (0.0767) (0.0766) 
 549b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 550.yrmo     -0.345** 
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      (0.137) 
 551.yrmo     -0.669*** 
      (0.107) 
 552.yrmo     -0.832*** 
      (0.136) 
 Constant -3.213*** -3.205*** -3.387*** -2.130*** -1.643*** 
  (0.112) (0.110) (0.120) (0.386) (0.351) 
       
 Observations 24,929 24,836 24,436 24,436 24,436 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 12: Predicting Confidence in Coalition Forces - Three-Model Comparison (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province 
Cluster) 
  All Sunni Provinces Nationwide 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_CF conf_CF conf_CF 
     
conf_CF male 0.0285 -0.368** 0.0285 
  (0.0806) (0.145) (0.0806) 
 over40 0.0152 0.00719 0.0152 
  (0.0610) (0.148) (0.0610) 
 collgrad 0.0286 -0.149 0.0286 
  (0.171) (0.336) (0.171) 
 Shia_Arab -0.651  -0.651 
  (0.434)  (0.434) 
 Sunni_Arab -0.622  -0.622 
  (0.405)  (0.405) 
 Kurd 2.781***  2.781*** 
  (0.275)  (0.275) 
 Other 0.783***  0.783*** 
  (0.187)  (0.187) 
 water -0.0183 0.839*** -0.0183 
  (0.125) (0.160) (0.125) 
 cookfuel 0.317*** 0.363** 0.317*** 
  (0.100) (0.157) (0.100) 
 gas 0.407*** 0.664*** 0.407*** 
  (0.138) (0.197) (0.138) 
 elec -0.214* -0.334** -0.214* 
  (0.120) (0.162) (0.120) 
 unemployed -0.0692 0.203 -0.0692 
  (0.0900) (0.239) (0.0900) 
 security 0.768*** 2.807*** 0.768*** 
  (0.142) (0.144) (0.142) 
 l1_ln_sigact -0.206*** 0.0457 -0.206*** 
  (0.0767) (0.186) (0.0767) 
 Constant -2.130*** -4.332*** -2.130*** 
  (0.386) (0.888) (0.386) 
     
 Observations 24,436 5,143 24,436 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Government - All Communities, All Waves (Oct '05 - Jan '06: 
Province Cluster) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_gov conf_gov conf_gov conf_gov conf_gov 
       
conf_gov male -0.259*** -0.257*** -0.287*** -0.286*** -0.280*** 
  (0.0594) (0.0587) (0.0557) (0.0541) (0.0531) 
 over40 -0.00267 -0.00476 -0.0252 -0.0164 -0.0136 
  (0.0474) (0.0489) (0.0516) (0.0497) (0.0489) 
 collgrad -0.314*** -0.314*** -0.279*** -0.265*** -0.265*** 
  (0.0607) (0.0613) (0.0651) (0.0674) (0.0683) 
 Shia_Arab 1.230*** 1.231*** 0.881*** 0.668*** 0.648*** 
  (0.223) (0.223) (0.146) (0.0983) (0.0989) 
 Sunni_Arab -2.050*** -2.050*** -1.947*** -2.029*** -2.058*** 
  (0.267) (0.268) (0.253) (0.271) (0.272) 
 Kurd 0.857*** 0.850*** 0.214 -0.118 -0.157 
  (0.318) (0.314) (0.255) (0.265) (0.265) 
 Other -0.782* -0.782* -0.854* -0.946* -0.959** 
  (0.459) (0.458) (0.452) (0.489) (0.487) 
 water 0.238* 0.235* 0.181 0.183 0.167 
  (0.134) (0.133) (0.125) (0.123) (0.127) 
 cookfuel 0.383*** 0.386*** 0.333*** 0.313*** 0.233** 
  (0.0992) (0.0997) (0.103) (0.113) (0.110) 
 gas 0.128 0.127 0.0811 0.0853 0.121 
  (0.104) (0.106) (0.0763) (0.0755) (0.0782) 
 elec -0.232* -0.236* -0.299*** -0.284*** -0.285*** 
  (0.124) (0.123) (0.0878) (0.0877) (0.0908) 
 unemployed  0.00915 -0.0115 -0.0328 -0.0472 
   (0.0585) (0.0578) (0.0574) (0.0621) 
 security   1.755*** 1.689*** 1.634*** 
    (0.127) (0.122) (0.129) 
 l1_ln_sigact    -0.0840** -0.101** 
     (0.0403) (0.0415) 
 549b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 550.yrmo     0.295** 
      (0.121) 
 551.yrmo     0.355*** 
      (0.101) 
 552.yrmo     -0.00758 
      (0.0491) 
 Constant 0.940*** 0.940*** 0.752*** 1.243*** 1.222*** 
  (0.131) (0.131) (0.123) (0.185) (0.180) 
       
 Observations 24,547 24,443 24,054 24,054 24,054 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Government - Three-Model Comparison (Oct '05 - Jan '06: 
Province Cluster) 
  All Sunni 
Provinces 
Nationwide 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_gov conf_gov conf_gov 
     
conf_gov male -0.286*** -0.524*** -0.286*** 
  (0.0541) (0.0744) (0.0541) 
 over40 -0.0164 -0.145* -0.0164 
  (0.0497) (0.0775) (0.0497) 
 collgrad -0.265*** -0.00302 -0.265*** 
  (0.0674) (0.172) (0.0674) 
 Shia_Arab 0.668***  0.668*** 
  (0.0983)  (0.0983) 
 Sunni_Arab -2.029***  -2.029*** 
  (0.271)  (0.271) 
 Kurd -0.118  -0.118 
  (0.265)  (0.265) 
 Other -0.946*  -0.946* 
  (0.489)  (0.489) 
 water 0.183 0.290*** 0.183 
  (0.123) (0.0747) (0.123) 
 cookfuel 0.313*** 0.665*** 0.313*** 
  (0.113) (0.0802) (0.113) 
 gas 0.0853 0.324** 0.0853 
  (0.0755) (0.133) (0.0755) 
 elec -0.284*** -0.208** -0.284*** 
  (0.0877) (0.0834) (0.0877) 
 unemployed -0.0328 -0.0410 -0.0328 
  (0.0574) (0.121) (0.0574) 
 security 1.689*** 2.654*** 1.689*** 
  (0.122) (0.130) (0.122) 
 l1_ln_sigact -0.0840** -0.128 -0.0840** 
  (0.0403) (0.0871) (0.0403) 
 Constant 1.243*** -0.736* 1.243*** 
  (0.185) (0.414) (0.185) 
     
 Observations 24,054 4,780 24,054 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Police - All Communities, All Waves (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province 
Cluster) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_IP conf_IP conf_IP conf_IP conf_IP 
       
conf_IP male -0.345*** -0.340*** -0.374*** -0.374*** -0.375*** 
  (0.0683) (0.0651) (0.0619) (0.0621) (0.0595) 
 over40 -0.0331 -0.0365 -0.0469 -0.0326 -0.0326 
  (0.0342) (0.0352) (0.0360) (0.0388) (0.0372) 
 collgrad -0.343*** -0.345*** -0.313*** -0.290*** -0.287*** 
  (0.0543) (0.0531) (0.0519) (0.0520) (0.0530) 
 Shia_Arab 1.390*** 1.394*** 1.074*** 0.682** 0.694** 
  (0.392) (0.395) (0.339) (0.286) (0.282) 
 Sunni_Arab -0.947* -0.947* -0.781 -0.942 -0.956 
  (0.541) (0.542) (0.550) (0.580) (0.583) 
 Kurd 1.439*** 1.453*** 0.893*** 0.286 0.303 
  (0.400) (0.398) (0.321) (0.347) (0.343) 
 Other -0.352 -0.347 -0.388* -0.553** -0.555** 
  (0.219) (0.220) (0.205) (0.245) (0.243) 
 water 0.134* 0.135* 0.0848 0.0877 0.0844 
  (0.0729) (0.0738) (0.0669) (0.0644) (0.0560) 
 cookfuel -0.189* -0.183 -0.267*** -0.314*** -0.294*** 
  (0.112) (0.111) (0.103) (0.102) (0.0966) 
 gas 0.162 0.164 0.136 0.151 0.137 
  (0.143) (0.145) (0.111) (0.101) (0.108) 
 elec 0.0379 0.0406 0.00282 0.0370 0.0902 
  (0.114) (0.113) (0.0807) (0.0871) (0.0985) 
 unemployed  -0.0531 -0.0829 -0.124** -0.124** 
   (0.0667) (0.0601) (0.0553) (0.0575) 
 security   1.643*** 1.527*** 1.531*** 
    (0.132) (0.109) (0.114) 
 l1_ln_sigact    -0.157*** -0.152*** 
     (0.0332) (0.0315) 
 549b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 550.yrmo     -0.0235 
      (0.0998) 
 551.yrmo     0.148** 
      (0.0710) 
 552.yrmo     0.122 
      (0.107) 
 Constant 0.885*** 0.886*** 0.699*** 1.626*** 1.533*** 
  (0.136) (0.137) (0.129) (0.332) (0.333) 
       
 Observations 26,016 25,915 25,477 25,477 25,477 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Police - Three-Model Comparison (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province 
Cluster) 
  All Sunni 
Provinces 
Nationwide 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_IP conf_IP conf_IP 
     
conf_IP male -0.374*** -0.477*** -0.374*** 
  (0.0621) (0.0599) (0.0621) 
 over40 -0.0326 -0.126** -0.0326 
  (0.0388) (0.0621) (0.0388) 
 collgrad -0.290*** -0.0491 -0.290*** 
  (0.0520) (0.140) (0.0520) 
 Shia_Arab 0.682**  0.682** 
  (0.286)  (0.286) 
 Sunni_Arab -0.942  -0.942 
  (0.580)  (0.580) 
 Kurd 0.286  0.286 
  (0.347)  (0.347) 
 Other -0.553**  -0.553** 
  (0.245)  (0.245) 
 water 0.0877 0.0252 0.0877 
  (0.0644) (0.0602) (0.0644) 
 cookfuel -0.314*** -0.526*** -0.314*** 
  (0.102) (0.0670) (0.102) 
 gas 0.151 0.534*** 0.151 
  (0.101) (0.119) (0.101) 
 elec 0.0370 0.0449 0.0370 
  (0.0871) (0.0675) (0.0871) 
 unemployed -0.124** -0.0925 -0.124** 
  (0.0553) (0.0966) (0.0553) 
 security 1.527*** 2.078*** 1.527*** 
  (0.109) (0.137) (0.109) 
 l1_ln_sigact -0.157*** 0.269*** -0.157*** 
  (0.0332) (0.0665) (0.0332) 
 Constant 1.626*** -1.178*** 1.626*** 
  (0.332) (0.317) (0.332) 
     
 Observations 25,477 5,164 25,477 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Army - All Communities, All Waves (Oct '05 - Jan '06) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_IA conf_IA conf_IA conf_IA conf_IA 
       
conf_IA male -0.276*** -0.281*** -0.315*** -0.316*** -0.315*** 
  (0.0611) (0.0598) (0.0546) (0.0552) (0.0541) 
 over40 -0.0207 -0.0214 -0.0353 -0.0170 -0.0164 
  (0.0266) (0.0273) (0.0279) (0.0289) (0.0276) 
 collgrad -0.192*** -0.196*** -0.161*** -0.130*** -0.129*** 
  (0.0459) (0.0459) (0.0440) (0.0443) (0.0443) 
 Shia_Arab 1.454*** 1.457*** 1.134*** 0.682** 0.681** 
  (0.460) (0.464) (0.407) (0.321) (0.312) 
 Sunni_Arab -1.579*** -1.579*** -1.434*** -1.629*** -1.638*** 
  (0.312) (0.314) (0.302) (0.361) (0.364) 
 Kurd 1.425*** 1.428*** 0.857*** 0.135 0.131 
  (0.393) (0.393) (0.310) (0.357) (0.350) 
 Other -0.340 -0.336 -0.373 -0.570** -0.566** 
  (0.250) (0.252) (0.237) (0.281) (0.276) 
 water 0.0894 0.0927 0.0410 0.0447 0.0439 
  (0.0986) (0.0991) (0.0942) (0.0908) (0.0886) 
 cookfuel 0.0676 0.0701 -0.00434 -0.0600 -0.0847 
  (0.0849) (0.0852) (0.0867) (0.119) (0.0958) 
 gas 0.0288 0.0357 -0.0100 0.00397 0.0112 
  (0.130) (0.131) (0.0969) (0.0919) (0.0962) 
 elec -0.0908 -0.0832 -0.141 -0.105 -0.0815 
  (0.158) (0.156) (0.104) (0.101) (0.118) 
 unemployed  0.0209 -0.00111 -0.0519 -0.0572 
   (0.0724) (0.0630) (0.0604) (0.0614) 
 security   1.691*** 1.555*** 1.542*** 
    (0.146) (0.118) (0.125) 
 l1_ln_sigact    -0.188*** -0.192*** 
     (0.0366) (0.0349) 
 549b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 550.yrmo     -0.0208 
      (0.0718) 
 551.yrmo     0.142* 
      (0.0764) 
 552.yrmo     -0.0154 
      (0.120) 
 Constant 0.803*** 0.798*** 0.607*** 1.719*** 1.719*** 
  (0.146) (0.147) (0.135) (0.365) (0.336) 
       
 Observations 25,695 25,597 25,167 25,167 25,167 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 18: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Army - Three-Model Comparison (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province 
Cluster) 
  All Sunni 
Provinces 
Nationwide 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_IA conf_IA conf_IA 
     
conf_IA male -0.316*** -0.532*** -0.316*** 
  (0.0552) (0.0656) (0.0552) 
 over40 -0.0170 -0.0270 -0.0170 
  (0.0289) (0.0682) (0.0289) 
 collgrad -0.130*** 0.0507 -0.130*** 
  (0.0443) (0.150) (0.0443) 
 Shia_Arab 0.682**  0.682** 
  (0.321)  (0.321) 
 Sunni_Arab -1.629***  -1.629*** 
  (0.361)  (0.361) 
 Kurd 0.135  0.135 
  (0.357)  (0.357) 
 Other -0.570**  -0.570** 
  (0.281)  (0.281) 
 water 0.0447 0.128* 0.0447 
  (0.0908) (0.0661) (0.0908) 
 cookfuel -0.0600 0.0575 -0.0600 
  (0.119) (0.0721) (0.119) 
 gas 0.00397 0.374*** 0.00397 
  (0.0919) (0.123) (0.0919) 
 elec -0.105 -0.133* -0.105 
  (0.101) (0.0740) (0.101) 
 unemployed -0.0519 -0.0298 -0.0519 
  (0.0604) (0.107) (0.0604) 
 security 1.555*** 2.418*** 1.555*** 
  (0.118) (0.129) (0.118) 
 l1_ln_sigact -0.188*** 0.198*** -0.188*** 
  (0.0366) (0.0744) (0.0366) 
 Constant 1.719*** -1.703*** 1.719*** 
  (0.365) (0.355) (0.365) 
     
 Observations 25,167 5,081 25,167 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 19: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - All Communities, All Waves 
(Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province Cluster) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO 
       
conf_ANO male 0.138* 0.133 0.139 0.137 0.138 
  (0.0789) (0.0881) (0.0869) (0.0861) (0.0886) 
 over40 -0.0217 -0.0223 -0.0218 -0.0346 -0.0354 
  (0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0278) (0.0294) (0.0290) 
 collgrad 0.00957 0.00725 0.000751 -0.0189 -0.0211 
  (0.0690) (0.0680) (0.0719) (0.0705) (0.0747) 
 Shia_Arab -1.286*** -1.289*** -1.159*** -0.817*** -0.834*** 
  (0.266) (0.269) (0.243) (0.194) (0.188) 
 Sunni_Arab 1.922*** 1.922*** 1.876*** 2.021*** 2.048*** 
  (0.293) (0.293) (0.281) (0.323) (0.323) 
 Kurd -1.073*** -1.060*** -0.838** -0.281 -0.319 
  (0.406) (0.399) (0.368) (0.366) (0.357) 
 Other 0.249 0.251 0.275 0.436 0.435 
  (0.377) (0.375) (0.371) (0.398) (0.399) 
 water -0.0121 -0.00975 0.0171 0.0234 0.0523 
  (0.166) (0.165) (0.156) (0.154) (0.147) 
 cookfuel -0.0606 -0.0609 -0.0262 0.00940 -0.0356 
  (0.105) (0.105) (0.112) (0.135) (0.122) 
 gas 0.0366 0.0371 0.0470 0.0357 0.0604 
  (0.113) (0.112) (0.105) (0.101) (0.108) 
 elec 0.283* 0.283* 0.287* 0.276 0.202 
  (0.152) (0.153) (0.156) (0.168) (0.176) 
 unemployed  0.0485 0.0464 0.0855 0.0850 
   (0.128) (0.122) (0.120) (0.128) 
 security   -0.495*** -0.378*** -0.373*** 
    (0.119) (0.0947) (0.104) 
 l1_ln_sigact    0.135*** 0.126*** 
     (0.0424) (0.0425) 
 549b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 550.yrmo     -0.177 
      (0.158) 
 551.yrmo     -0.292* 
      (0.175) 
 552.yrmo     -0.324** 
      (0.135) 
 Constant -0.743*** -0.745*** -0.680*** -1.488*** -1.251*** 
  (0.248) (0.244) (0.240) (0.314) (0.310) 
       
 Observations 20,851 20,773 20,473 20,473 20,473 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - Three-Model Comparison 
(Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province Cluster) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO 
     
conf_ANO male 0.137 0.0364 0.137 
  (0.0861) (0.0779) (0.0861) 
 over40 -0.0346 -0.0835 -0.0346 
  (0.0294) (0.0796) (0.0294) 
 collgrad -0.0189 -0.308* -0.0189 
  (0.0705) (0.160) (0.0705) 
 Shia_Arab -0.817***  -0.817*** 
  (0.194)  (0.194) 
 Sunni_Arab 2.021***  2.021*** 
  (0.323)  (0.323) 
 Kurd -0.281  -0.281 
  (0.366)  (0.366) 
 Other 0.436  0.436 
  (0.398)  (0.398) 
 water 0.0234 -0.162** 0.0234 
  (0.154) (0.0786) (0.154) 
 cookfuel 0.00940 -0.251*** 0.00940 
  (0.135) (0.0849) (0.135) 
 gas 0.0357 -0.470*** 0.0357 
  (0.101) (0.133) (0.101) 
 elec 0.276 0.0314 0.276 
  (0.168) (0.0876) (0.168) 
 unemployed 0.0855 0.306** 0.0855 
  (0.120) (0.131) (0.120) 
 security -0.378*** -1.521*** -0.378*** 
  (0.0947) (0.117) (0.0947) 
 l1_ln_sigact 0.135*** 0.237*** 0.135*** 
  (0.0424) (0.0887) (0.0424) 
 Constant -1.488*** 0.435 -1.488*** 
  (0.314) (0.422) (0.314) 
     
 Observations 20,473 4,246 20,473 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 21: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) Controlling for Confidence in 
the Iraqi Government - All Communities, All Waves 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO 
       
conf_ANO male 0.168*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.137*** 0.156*** 
  (0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0294) (0.0315) (0.0317) 
 over40 -0.0655** -0.0657** -0.0644** -0.0476 -0.0637** 
  (0.0291) (0.0288) (0.0284) (0.0306) (0.0309) 
 collgrad -0.195*** -0.192*** -0.202*** -0.193*** -0.240*** 
  (0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0521) (0.0500) (0.0538) 
 Shia_Arab -0.833*** -0.832*** -0.822*** -0.776*** -0.648*** 
  (0.133) (0.134) (0.129) (0.133) (0.122) 
 Sunni_Arab 1.201*** 1.200*** 1.180*** 0.952*** 1.106*** 
  (0.232) (0.232) (0.226) (0.165) (0.174) 
 Kurd -1.232*** -1.240*** -1.182*** -1.200*** -0.852*** 
  (0.127) (0.127) (0.130) (0.126) (0.162) 
 Other -0.202 -0.202 -0.208 -0.261 -0.171 
  (0.172) (0.173) (0.169) (0.162) (0.186) 
 water 0.0697 0.0701 0.0828 0.0919 0.0926* 
  (0.0570) (0.0565) (0.0561) (0.0615) (0.0533) 
 cookfuel -0.0674 -0.0669 -0.0627 -0.0151 -0.162*** 
  (0.0762) (0.0761) (0.0733) (0.0667) (0.0559) 
 gas -0.0299 -0.0298 -0.0177 0.0377 -0.0854 
  (0.109) (0.108) (0.106) (0.0914) (0.0810) 
 elec 0.0600 0.0596 0.0595 0.0874 -0.0102 
  (0.0811) (0.0797) (0.0796) (0.0850) (0.106) 
 unemployed  0.0261 0.0300 0.0159 0.0163 
   (0.0753) (0.0752) (0.0763) (0.0750) 
 security   -0.220*** -0.0794 -0.107 
    (0.0847) (0.0684) (0.0694) 
 conf_gov    -0.772*** -0.858*** 
     (0.0985) (0.0990) 
 537b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 540.yrmo     -0.0538 
      (0.140) 
 541.yrmo     -0.169 
      (0.215) 
 542.yrmo     -0.226 
      (0.235) 
 543.yrmo     0.402** 
      (0.205) 
 544.yrmo     0.0623 
      (0.180) 
 545.yrmo     0.0472 
      (0.148) 
 546.yrmo     -0.105 
      (0.0812) 
 547.yrmo     -0.359** 
      (0.154) 
 548.yrmo     -0.535*** 
      (0.161) 
 553.yrmo     -0.541*** 
      (0.196) 
 554.yrmo     -0.720*** 
      (0.174) 
 557.yrmo     -0.266 
      (0.239) 
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 558.yrmo     -0.513** 
      (0.215) 
 559.yrmo     -0.500*** 
      (0.177) 
 560.yrmo     -0.638*** 
      (0.183) 
 Constant -0.710*** -0.711*** -0.682*** -0.172 0.139 
  (0.109) (0.108) (0.115) (0.141) (0.181) 
       
 Observations 64,098 63,864 63,121 57,437 57,437 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 22: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) Controlling for Confidence in 
the Iraqi Government - Four-Model Comparison 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO 
      
conf_ANO male 0.137*** -0.0692 0.125*** 0.128** 
  (0.0315) (0.0700) (0.0413) (0.0645) 
 over40 -0.0476 -0.102 -0.0277 -0.101*** 
  (0.0306) (0.0861) (0.0405) (0.0373) 
 collgrad -0.193*** -0.0147 -0.145*** -0.261** 
  (0.0500) (0.0626) (0.0544) (0.104) 
 Shia_Arab -0.776***  -0.474*** -1.035*** 
  (0.133)  (0.0695) (0.354) 
 Sunni_Arab 0.952***  0.485*** 1.542*** 
  (0.165)  (0.148) (0.349) 
 Kurd -1.200***  -1.426*** -0.813** 
  (0.126)  (0.338) (0.395) 
 Other -0.261  -0.319 0.0187 
  (0.162)  (0.216) (0.403) 
 water 0.0919 -0.324** 0.166*** 0.0415 
  (0.0615) (0.141) (0.0634) (0.0945) 
 cookfuel -0.0151 -0.496*** 0.0968 -0.148 
  (0.0667) (0.162) (0.0670) (0.117) 
 gas 0.0377 -1.059*** 0.0619 -0.250 
  (0.0914) (0.242) (0.0746) (0.245) 
 elec 0.0874 -0.0628 0.0743 0.110 
  (0.0850) (0.0809) (0.0645) (0.179) 
 unemployed 0.0159 0.285 0.0691 0.0876 
  (0.0763) (0.237) (0.0912) (0.115) 
 security -0.0794 -0.803*** 0.00726 -0.0441 
  (0.0684) (0.257) (0.0387) (0.160) 
 conf_gov -0.772*** -1.717*** -0.571*** -0.841*** 
  (0.0985) (0.544) (0.0966) (0.155) 
 Constant -0.172 1.741*** -0.478*** -0.389 
  (0.141) (0.155) (0.134) (0.369) 
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 Observations 57,437 7,256 34,387 30,323 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 23: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) Controlling for Confidence in 
the Iraqi Police - All Communities, All Waves 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO 
       
conf_ANO male 0.168*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.149*** 0.161*** 
  (0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0294) (0.0285) (0.0278) 
 over40 -0.0655** -0.0657** -0.0644** -0.0591** -0.0678** 
  (0.0291) (0.0288) (0.0284) (0.0282) (0.0284) 
 collgrad -0.195*** -0.192*** -0.202*** -0.212*** -0.240*** 
  (0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0521) (0.0499) (0.0478) 
 Shia_Arab -0.833*** -0.832*** -0.822*** -0.782*** -0.708*** 
  (0.133) (0.134) (0.129) (0.128) (0.131) 
 Sunni_Arab 1.201*** 1.200*** 1.180*** 1.115*** 1.219*** 
  (0.232) (0.232) (0.226) (0.215) (0.209) 
 Kurd -1.232*** -1.240*** -1.182*** -1.122*** -0.919*** 
  (0.127) (0.127) (0.130) (0.129) (0.158) 
 Other -0.202 -0.202 -0.208 -0.179 -0.127 
  (0.172) (0.173) (0.169) (0.158) (0.181) 
 water 0.0697 0.0701 0.0828 0.0873 0.0961* 
  (0.0570) (0.0565) (0.0561) (0.0559) (0.0530) 
 cookfuel -0.0674 -0.0669 -0.0627 -0.0468 -0.181*** 
  (0.0762) (0.0761) (0.0733) (0.0722) (0.0569) 
 gas -0.0299 -0.0298 -0.0177 -0.00321 -0.114 
  (0.109) (0.108) (0.106) (0.105) (0.0899) 
 elec 0.0600 0.0596 0.0595 0.0643 0.0161 
  (0.0811) (0.0797) (0.0796) (0.0786) (0.0963) 
 unemployed  0.0261 0.0300 0.0177 0.0193 
   (0.0753) (0.0752) (0.0722) (0.0718) 
 security   -0.220*** -0.181** -0.207*** 
    (0.0847) (0.0817) (0.0769) 
 conf_IP    -0.289** -0.297** 
     (0.124) (0.129) 
 537b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 540.yrmo     -0.0568 
      (0.152) 
 541.yrmo     -0.196 
      (0.204) 
 542.yrmo     -0.201 
      (0.220) 
 543.yrmo     0.515** 
      (0.205) 
 544.yrmo     0.138 
      (0.171) 
 545.yrmo     0.174 
      (0.150) 
 546.yrmo     0.00819 
      (0.0905) 
 547.yrmo     -0.227 
      (0.152) 
 548.yrmo     -0.371*** 
      (0.140) 
 553.yrmo     -0.306* 
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      (0.184) 
 554.yrmo     -0.515*** 
      (0.167) 
 557.yrmo     -0.0753 
      (0.240) 
 558.yrmo     -0.261 
      (0.211) 
 559.yrmo     -0.214 
      (0.181) 
 560.yrmo     -0.328* 
      (0.188) 
 Constant -0.710*** -0.711*** -0.682*** -0.485*** -0.351* 
  (0.109) (0.108) (0.115) (0.139) (0.181) 
       
 Observations 64,098 63,864 63,121 62,323 62,323 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 24: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) Controlling for Confidence in 
the Iraqi Police - Four-Model Comparison 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO 
      
conf_ANO male 0.149*** 0.0306 0.124*** 0.147** 
  (0.0285) (0.0704) (0.0372) (0.0605) 
 over40 -0.0591** -0.0808 -0.0290 -0.0916** 
  (0.0282) (0.0852) (0.0360) (0.0356) 
 collgrad -0.212*** 0.0497 -0.135*** -0.289*** 
  (0.0499) (0.0678) (0.0470) (0.109) 
 Shia_Arab -0.782***  -0.486*** -1.150*** 
  (0.128)  (0.0639) (0.343) 
 Sunni_Arab 1.115***  0.493*** 1.782*** 
  (0.215)  (0.124) (0.392) 
 Kurd -1.122***  -1.522*** -0.853** 
  (0.129)  (0.333) (0.390) 
 Other -0.179  -0.305* 0.127 
  (0.158)  (0.176) (0.423) 
 water 0.0873 -0.461* 0.162*** 0.0405 
  (0.0559) (0.243) (0.0589) (0.0969) 
 cookfuel -0.0468 -0.459*** 0.0988 -0.157 
  (0.0722) (0.104) (0.0638) (0.109) 
 gas -0.00321 -1.038*** 0.0625 -0.322 
  (0.105) (0.207) (0.0903) (0.244) 
 elec 0.0643 -0.170 0.0700 0.125 
  (0.0786) (0.177) (0.0539) (0.180) 
 unemployed 0.0177 0.239 0.0520 0.104 
  (0.0722) (0.227) (0.0856) (0.110) 
 security -0.181** -1.848*** -0.0215 -0.236 
  (0.0817) (0.307) (0.0439) (0.173) 
 conf_IP -0.289** -0.116 -0.292*** -0.163 
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  (0.124) (0.433) (0.106) (0.195) 
 Constant -0.485*** 1.563*** -0.686*** -0.738* 
  (0.139) (0.198) (0.130) (0.393) 
      
 Observations 62,323 7,637 38,101 32,112 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 25: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) Controlling for Confidence in 
the Iraqi Army - All Communities, All Waves 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO 
       
conf_ANO male 0.168*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.139*** 0.153*** 
  (0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0294) (0.0286) (0.0277) 
 over40 -0.0655** -0.0657** -0.0644** -0.0494* -0.0592** 
  (0.0291) (0.0288) (0.0284) (0.0286) (0.0291) 
 collgrad -0.195*** -0.192*** -0.202*** -0.216*** -0.245*** 
  (0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0521) (0.0500) (0.0494) 
 Shia_Arab -0.833*** -0.832*** -0.822*** -0.730*** -0.644*** 
  (0.133) (0.134) (0.129) (0.120) (0.120) 
 Sunni_Arab 1.201*** 1.200*** 1.180*** 0.993*** 1.111*** 
  (0.232) (0.232) (0.226) (0.180) (0.183) 
 Kurd -1.232*** -1.240*** -1.182*** -1.038*** -0.801*** 
  (0.127) (0.127) (0.130) (0.123) (0.158) 
 Other -0.202 -0.202 -0.208 -0.145 -0.0825 
  (0.172) (0.173) (0.169) (0.150) (0.176) 
 water 0.0697 0.0701 0.0828 0.0853 0.0985** 
  (0.0570) (0.0565) (0.0561) (0.0547) (0.0489) 
 cookfuel -0.0674 -0.0669 -0.0627 -0.0103 -0.153*** 
  (0.0762) (0.0761) (0.0733) (0.0684) (0.0525) 
 gas -0.0299 -0.0298 -0.0177 0.0363 -0.0818 
  (0.109) (0.108) (0.106) (0.102) (0.0865) 
 elec 0.0600 0.0596 0.0595 0.0853 0.0278 
  (0.0811) (0.0797) (0.0796) (0.0806) (0.0949) 
 unemployed  0.0261 0.0300 0.0218 0.0228 
   (0.0753) (0.0752) (0.0707) (0.0707) 
 security   -0.220*** -0.117 -0.145** 
    (0.0847) (0.0733) (0.0713) 
 conf_IA    -0.678*** -0.693*** 
     (0.128) (0.126) 
 537b.yrmo     0 
      (0) 
 540.yrmo     -0.105 
      (0.159) 
 541.yrmo     -0.258 
      (0.192) 
 542.yrmo     -0.206 
      (0.203) 
 543.yrmo     0.479*** 
      (0.178) 
 544.yrmo     0.104 
      (0.155) 
 545.yrmo     0.140 
      (0.146) 
 546.yrmo     -0.0134 
      (0.0855) 
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 547.yrmo     -0.244* 
      (0.138) 
 548.yrmo     -0.387*** 
      (0.128) 
 553.yrmo     -0.347* 
      (0.184) 
 554.yrmo     -0.581*** 
      (0.165) 
 557.yrmo     -0.142 
      (0.229) 
 558.yrmo     -0.326 
      (0.206) 
 559.yrmo     -0.279 
      (0.172) 
 560.yrmo     -0.420** 
      (0.177) 
 Constant -0.710*** -0.711*** -0.682*** -0.255* -0.0785 
  (0.109) (0.108) (0.115) (0.143) (0.175) 
       
 Observations 64,098 63,864 63,121 61,214 61,214 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 26: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) Controlling for Confidence in 
the Iraqi Army - Four-Model Comparison 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EQUATION VARIABLES conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO conf_ANO 
      
conf_ANO male 0.139*** -0.0165 0.118*** 0.134** 
  (0.0286) (0.0644) (0.0364) (0.0622) 
 over40 -0.0494* -0.102 -0.0186 -0.0961** 
  (0.0286) (0.0878) (0.0358) (0.0373) 
 collgrad -0.216*** 0.0166 -0.144*** -0.280*** 
  (0.0500) (0.0927) (0.0497) (0.109) 
 Shia_Arab -0.730***  -0.454*** -1.001*** 
  (0.120)  (0.0543) (0.342) 
 Sunni_Arab 0.993***  0.444*** 1.575*** 
  (0.180)  (0.109) (0.351) 
 Kurd -1.038***  -1.444*** -0.671* 
  (0.123)  (0.320) (0.394) 
 Other -0.145  -0.269 0.155 
  (0.150)  (0.179) (0.397) 
 water 0.0853 -0.414** 0.158*** 0.0346 
  (0.0547) (0.205) (0.0605) (0.0897) 
 cookfuel -0.0103 -0.434*** 0.121** -0.150 
  (0.0684) (0.151) (0.0610) (0.109) 
 gas 0.0363 -1.046*** 0.0889 -0.320 
  (0.102) (0.155) (0.0878) (0.227) 
 elec 0.0853 -0.168 0.0870 0.137 
  (0.0806) (0.145) (0.0576) (0.169) 
 unemployed 0.0218 0.262 0.0550 0.102 
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  (0.0707) (0.230) (0.0844) (0.105) 
 security -0.117 -1.414*** 0.0107 -0.124 
  (0.0733) (0.351) (0.0434) (0.162) 
 conf_IA -0.678*** -0.887** -0.503*** -0.790*** 
  (0.128) (0.428) (0.153) (0.173) 
 Constant -0.255* 1.767*** -0.569*** -0.381 
  (0.143) (0.144) (0.140) (0.350) 
      
 Observations 61,214 7,654 37,073 31,900 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX C: TEST II REGRESSION TABLES 
 
Table 27: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces - All 
Communities, All Waves 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 
      
Shia_Arab 0.477* 0.455* 0.394 0.391 0.113 
 (0.248) (0.249) (0.247) (0.247) (0.245) 
Sunni_Arab 0.292 0.299 0.210 0.203 -0.0763 
 (0.303) (0.303) (0.301) (0.302) (0.295) 
Kurd 1.807*** 1.708*** 1.527** 1.539** 0.948 
 (0.623) (0.631) (0.626) (0.627) (0.620) 
Other 1.046 1.018 1.138 1.181 1.106 
 (1.017) (1.018) (1.006) (1.013) (0.974) 
water -0.535*** -0.544*** -0.456** -0.448** -0.287 
 (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.197) (0.193) 
cookfuel -0.00825 -0.0138 -0.137 -0.131 0.0938 
 (0.201) (0.201) (0.203) (0.203) (0.200) 
gas -0.287 -0.260 -0.0526 -0.0530 0.0354 
 (0.223) (0.224) (0.232) (0.232) (0.225) 
elec -0.312 -0.260 -0.299 -0.304 -0.401 
 (0.331) (0.335) (0.331) (0.331) (0.319) 
unemployed  -0.705 -0.567 -0.550 -0.492 
  (0.691) (0.684) (0.686) (0.674) 
security   -0.582*** -0.562*** 0.111 
   (0.194) (0.201) (0.241) 
conf_CF    -0.184 -0.423 
    (0.459) (0.445) 
post_Fallujah     -0.600*** 
     (0.118) 
post_Askaria     -0.302*** 
     (0.0749) 
Constant 2.397*** 2.478*** 2.586*** 2.597*** 2.965*** 
 (0.206) (0.221) (0.221) (0.223) (0.226) 
      
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 
R-squared 0.087 0.090 0.116 0.116 0.189 
Number of qada 44 44 44 44 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 28: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces - Four-
Model Comparison 
 All Sunni qadas Baghdad Nationwide 
VARIABLES F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 
     
Shia_Arab 0.113  0.430* -0.189 
 (0.245)  (0.256) (0.313) 
Sunni_Arab -0.0763 -1.673 -0.442 0.181 
 (0.295) (1.839) (0.276) (0.404) 
Kurd 0.948 -0.587 1.093 0.954 
 (0.620) (1.782) (1.475) (0.686) 
Other 1.106 -0.0610 -0.0363 0.670 
 (0.974) (2.271) (1.228) (1.105) 
water -0.287 -0.0971 -0.102 -0.314 
 (0.193) (0.278) (0.224) (0.244) 
cookfuel 0.0938 0.502 -0.271 0.412* 
 (0.200) (0.679) (0.315) (0.246) 
gas 0.0354 -1.133 0.377 0.0984 
 (0.225) (0.924) (0.292) (0.310) 
elec -0.401 -0.706 0.322 -0.334 
 (0.319) (0.570) (0.625) (0.344) 
unemployed -0.492 1.856 0.230 -0.0448 
 (0.674) (1.148) (1.313) (0.730) 
security 0.111 -2.073* 0.384 -0.130 
 (0.241) (1.094) (0.470) (0.282) 
conf_CF -0.423 -1.103 -0.887 0.0706 
 (0.445) (1.756) (0.821) (0.526) 
post_Fallujah -0.600***  -0.835***  
 (0.118)  (0.163)  
post_Askaria -0.302*** -0.0711 -0.511*** 0.0277 
 (0.0749) (0.124) (0.131) (0.130) 
post_rapemurder  0.0202  0.323** 
  (0.142)  (0.155) 
Constant 2.965*** 5.494*** 4.037*** 2.359*** 
 (0.226) (1.850) (0.242) (0.289) 
     
Observations 362 51 150 282 
R-squared 0.189 0.287 0.392 0.126 
Number of qada 44 9 10 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 29: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government - All 
Communities, All Waves 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 
      
Shia_Arab 0.477* 0.455* 0.394 0.376 0.123 
 (0.248) (0.249) (0.247) (0.246) (0.245) 
Sunni_Arab 0.292 0.299 0.210 0.120 -0.0654 
 (0.303) (0.303) (0.301) (0.306) (0.298) 
Kurd 1.807*** 1.708*** 1.527** 1.727*** 0.960 
 (0.623) (0.631) (0.626) (0.638) (0.639) 
Other 1.046 1.018 1.138 1.190 1.025 
 (1.017) (1.018) (1.006) (1.004) (0.972) 
water -0.535*** -0.544*** -0.456** -0.370* -0.299 
 (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.203) (0.197) 
cookfuel -0.00825 -0.0138 -0.137 -0.131 0.0749 
 (0.201) (0.201) (0.203) (0.202) (0.200) 
gas -0.287 -0.260 -0.0526 -0.0337 0.0385 
 (0.223) (0.224) (0.232) (0.232) (0.225) 
elec -0.312 -0.260 -0.299 -0.258 -0.381 
 (0.331) (0.335) (0.331) (0.331) (0.321) 
unemployed  -0.705 -0.567 -0.542 -0.514 
  (0.691) (0.684) (0.683) (0.675) 
security   -0.582*** -0.488** 0.0674 
   (0.194) (0.203) (0.238) 
conf_gov    -0.460 -0.0700 
    (0.302) (0.306) 
post_Fallujah     -0.585*** 
     (0.121) 
post_Askaria     -0.287*** 
     (0.0779) 
Constant 2.397*** 2.478*** 2.586*** 2.861*** 2.972*** 
 (0.206) (0.221) (0.221) (0.284) (0.276) 
      
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 
R-squared 0.087 0.090 0.116 0.122 0.187 
Number of qada 44 44 44 44 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 30: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government - 
Four-Model Comparison 
 All Sunni qadas Baghdad Nationwide 
VARIABLES F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 
     
Shia_Arab 0.123  0.476* -0.200 
 (0.245)  (0.255) (0.314) 
Sunni_Arab -0.0654 -1.631 -0.530* 0.190 
 (0.298) (1.779) (0.280) (0.406) 
Kurd 0.960 -1.524 1.389 0.896 
 (0.639) (1.857) (1.436) (0.712) 
Other 1.025 -1.445 -0.375 0.664 
 (0.972) (2.369) (1.206) (1.099) 
water -0.299 -0.0609 -0.0677 -0.324 
 (0.197) (0.274) (0.222) (0.246) 
cookfuel 0.0749 0.337 -0.432 0.411* 
 (0.200) (0.644) (0.318) (0.246) 
gas 0.0385 -0.966 0.531* 0.0956 
 (0.225) (0.901) (0.293) (0.310) 
elec -0.381 -0.865 0.415 -0.346 
 (0.321) (0.574) (0.623) (0.342) 
unemployed -0.514 1.476 -0.172 -0.0599 
 (0.675) (1.108) (1.312) (0.732) 
security 0.0674 -2.184* 0.317 -0.135 
 (0.238) (1.074) (0.447) (0.273) 
conf_gov -0.0700 1.042 -0.597* 0.122 
 (0.306) (0.777) (0.341) (0.371) 
post_Fallujah -0.585***  -0.803***  
 (0.121)  (0.162)  
post_Askaria -0.287*** -0.0480 -0.504*** 0.0317 
 (0.0779) (0.123) (0.129) (0.127) 
post_rapemurder  0.0940  0.338** 
  (0.150)  (0.154) 
Constant 2.972*** 5.392*** 4.417*** 2.293*** 
 (0.276) (1.792) (0.332) (0.353) 
     
Observations 362 51 150 282 
R-squared 0.187 0.318 0.401 0.126 
Number of qada 44 9 10 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 31: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police - All 
Communities, All Waves 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 
      
Shia_Arab 0.477* 0.455* 0.394 0.393 0.130 
 (0.248) (0.249) (0.247) (0.246) (0.245) 
Sunni_Arab 0.292 0.299 0.210 -0.0111 -0.133 
 (0.303) (0.303) (0.301) (0.321) (0.312) 
Kurd 1.807*** 1.708*** 1.527** 1.606** 0.971 
 (0.623) (0.631) (0.626) (0.624) (0.623) 
Other 1.046 1.018 1.138 1.442 1.142 
 (1.017) (1.018) (1.006) (1.014) (0.984) 
water -0.535*** -0.544*** -0.456** -0.410** -0.299 
 (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.192) 
cookfuel -0.00825 -0.0138 -0.137 -0.109 0.0801 
 (0.201) (0.201) (0.203) (0.202) (0.199) 
gas -0.287 -0.260 -0.0526 -0.0425 0.0382 
 (0.223) (0.224) (0.232) (0.231) (0.225) 
elec -0.312 -0.260 -0.299 -0.231 -0.358 
 (0.331) (0.335) (0.331) (0.331) (0.321) 
unemployed  -0.705 -0.567 -0.514 -0.490 
  (0.691) (0.684) (0.682) (0.675) 
security   -0.582*** -0.508** 0.0699 
   (0.194) (0.197) (0.235) 
conf_IP    -0.618* -0.243 
    (0.322) (0.323) 
post_Fallujah     -0.572*** 
     (0.121) 
post_Askaria     -0.278*** 
     (0.0769) 
Constant 2.397*** 2.478*** 2.586*** 3.049*** 3.103*** 
 (0.206) (0.221) (0.221) (0.326) (0.316) 
      
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 
R-squared 0.087 0.090 0.116 0.126 0.188 
Number of qada 44 44 44 44 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 32: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police - Four-
Model Comparison 
 All Sunni qadas Baghdad Nationwide 
VARIABLES F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 
     
Shia_Arab 0.130  0.439* -0.175 
 (0.245)  (0.262) (0.313) 
Sunni_Arab -0.133 -1.333 -0.436 0.126 
 (0.312) (1.835) (0.308) (0.414) 
Kurd 0.971 -0.355 1.406 1.012 
 (0.623) (1.841) (1.454) (0.687) 
Other 1.142 0.308 -0.236 0.826 
 (0.984) (2.426) (1.222) (1.120) 
water -0.299 -0.0707 -0.160 -0.300 
 (0.192) (0.284) (0.219) (0.245) 
cookfuel 0.0801 0.448 -0.315 0.409* 
 (0.199) (0.662) (0.314) (0.246) 
gas 0.0382 -1.165 0.425 0.0902 
 (0.225) (0.931) (0.290) (0.310) 
elec -0.358 -0.645 0.223 -0.312 
 (0.321) (0.565) (0.621) (0.344) 
unemployed -0.490 2.072 0.128 -0.0221 
 (0.675) (1.269) (1.320) (0.731) 
security 0.0699 -2.044* 0.229 -0.107 
 (0.235) (1.095) (0.451) (0.269) 
conf_IP -0.243 -0.276 -0.0339 -0.220 
 (0.323) (0.443) (0.375) (0.375) 
post_Fallujah -0.572***  -0.831***  
 (0.121)  (0.165)  
post_Askaria -0.278*** -0.0742 -0.496*** 0.0286 
 (0.0769) (0.124) (0.131) (0.127) 
post_rapemurder  -0.0366  0.310** 
  (0.166)  (0.153) 
Constant 3.103*** 5.254*** 4.036*** 2.522*** 
 (0.316) (1.837) (0.347) (0.399) 
     
Observations 362 51 150 282 
R-squared 0.188 0.287 0.386 0.127 
Number of qada 44 9 10 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 33: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army - All 
Communities, All Waves 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 
      
Shia_Arab 0.477* 0.455* 0.394 0.400 0.122 
 (0.248) (0.249) (0.247) (0.247) (0.245) 
Sunni_Arab 0.292 0.299 0.210 0.149 -0.0473 
 (0.303) (0.303) (0.301) (0.315) (0.306) 
Kurd 1.807*** 1.708*** 1.527** 1.550** 0.921 
 (0.623) (0.631) (0.626) (0.627) (0.622) 
Other 1.046 1.018 1.138 1.170 1.009 
 (1.017) (1.018) (1.006) (1.008) (0.972) 
water -0.535*** -0.544*** -0.456** -0.447** -0.310 
 (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.197) (0.192) 
cookfuel -0.00825 -0.0138 -0.137 -0.130 0.0762 
 (0.201) (0.201) (0.203) (0.203) (0.200) 
gas -0.287 -0.260 -0.0526 -0.0500 0.0359 
 (0.223) (0.224) (0.232) (0.232) (0.225) 
elec -0.312 -0.260 -0.299 -0.265 -0.393 
 (0.331) (0.335) (0.331) (0.335) (0.324) 
unemployed  -0.705 -0.567 -0.505 -0.531 
  (0.691) (0.684) (0.691) (0.682) 
security   -0.582*** -0.547*** 0.0551 
   (0.194) (0.202) (0.238) 
conf_IA    -0.195 0.0261 
    (0.299) (0.292) 
post_Fallujah     -0.593*** 
     (0.119) 
post_Askaria     -0.294*** 
     (0.0753) 
Constant 2.397*** 2.478*** 2.586*** 2.719*** 2.918*** 
 (0.206) (0.221) (0.221) (0.300) (0.292) 
      
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 
R-squared 0.087 0.090 0.116 0.117 0.186 
Number of qada 44 44 44 44 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 34: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army - Four-Model 
Comparison 
 All Sunni qadas Baghdad Nationwide 
VARIABLES F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 
     
Shia_Arab 0.122  0.379 -0.194 
 (0.245)  (0.263) (0.314) 
Sunni_Arab -0.0473 -2.386 -0.325 0.185 
 (0.306) (1.819) (0.296) (0.407) 
Kurd 0.921 -1.744 1.359 0.953 
 (0.622) (1.821) (1.450) (0.687) 
Other 1.009 -1.792 -0.232 0.679 
 (0.972) (2.333) (1.214) (1.099) 
water -0.310 -0.111 -0.194 -0.318 
 (0.192) (0.267) (0.221) (0.246) 
cookfuel 0.0762 0.512 -0.324 0.413* 
 (0.200) (0.634) (0.313) (0.246) 
gas 0.0359 -0.962 0.419 0.100 
 (0.225) (0.884) (0.289) (0.310) 
elec -0.393 -0.856 0.210 -0.347 
 (0.324) (0.554) (0.619) (0.348) 
unemployed -0.531 1.455 -0.169 -0.0579 
 (0.682) (1.084) (1.354) (0.737) 
security 0.0551 -2.935** 0.116 -0.123 
 (0.238) (1.166) (0.463) (0.271) 
conf_IA 0.0261 0.686* 0.330 0.0457 
 (0.292) (0.397) (0.362) (0.349) 
post_Fallujah -0.593***  -0.833***  
 (0.119)  (0.163)  
post_Askaria -0.294*** -0.0746 -0.509*** 0.0322 
 (0.0753) (0.119) (0.131) (0.127) 
post_rapemurder  0.0738  0.331** 
  (0.140)  (0.152) 
Constant 2.918*** 6.079*** 3.830*** 2.331*** 
 (0.292) (1.811) (0.314) (0.366) 
     
Observations 362 51 150 282 
R-squared 0.186 0.343 0.390 0.126 
Number of qada 44 9 10 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 35: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Armed National 
Opposition (Insurgency) - All Communities, All Waves 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 
      
Shia_Arab 0.407 0.409 0.323 -0.0128 -0.160 
 (0.353) (0.354) (0.347) (0.352) (0.349) 
Sunni_Arab 0.416 0.409 0.322 0.667 0.395 
 (0.429) (0.432) (0.423) (0.424) (0.426) 
Kurd 7.024*** 6.954*** 5.984*** 4.569*** 3.197* 
 (1.681) (1.716) (1.710) (1.716) (1.752) 
Other 2.062 2.049 2.780* 2.392 1.886 
 (1.686) (1.692) (1.672) (1.626) (1.602) 
water -0.460 -0.462 -0.271 -0.285 -0.244 
 (0.290) (0.291) (0.292) (0.283) (0.277) 
cookfuel 0.0674 0.0599 -0.104 -0.0943 -0.0529 
 (0.382) (0.385) (0.380) (0.369) (0.361) 
gas -0.122 -0.113 0.168 0.339 0.390 
 (0.384) (0.387) (0.391) (0.382) (0.375) 
elec -0.728 -0.708 -0.613 -0.452 -0.566 
 (0.567) (0.576) (0.564) (0.549) (0.539) 
unemployed  -0.301 -0.456 -0.528 -0.519 
  (1.362) (1.331) (1.291) (1.263) 
security   -0.769*** -0.868*** -0.203 
   (0.269) (0.263) (0.353) 
conf_ANO    -1.344*** -1.076** 
    (0.418) (0.421) 
post_Fallujah     -0.437*** 
     (0.159) 
Constant 2.274*** 2.307*** 2.468*** 3.073*** 3.315*** 
 (0.297) (0.332) (0.330) (0.371) (0.374) 
      
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 
R-squared 0.178 0.178 0.221 0.272 0.308 
Number of qada 42 42 42 42 42 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 36: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Armed National 
Opposition (Insurgency) - Four-Model Comparison 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 F.ln_sig1 
     
Shia_Arab -0.160 -4.140 0.0740 -0.561 
 (0.349) (9.938) (0.337) (0.612) 
Sunni_Arab 0.395 25.11 -0.0848 0.789 
 (0.426) (17.01) (0.384) (0.909) 
Kurd 3.197*  4.031 2.313 
 (1.752)  (2.480) (2.364) 
Other 1.886 22.08 0.0456 3.037 
 (1.602) (16.86) (1.709) (3.030) 
water -0.244 0.358 -0.0787 -0.328 
 (0.277) (0.748) (0.264) (0.529) 
cookfuel -0.0529 -0.877 -0.282 0.845 
 (0.361) (2.041) (0.434) (0.681) 
gas 0.390 -2.837 0.584 0.483 
 (0.375) (3.643) (0.416) (0.804) 
elec -0.566 3.148 0.220 -0.369 
 (0.539) (2.565) (0.903) (0.836) 
unemployed -0.519 15.12 -0.0393 1.136 
 (1.263) (7.958) (1.588) (1.908) 
security -0.203 42.04 0.000508 -0.650 
 (0.353) (31.42) (0.538) (0.539) 
conf_ANO -1.076** 3.093 -0.665 -0.630 
 (0.421) (2.451) (0.406) (0.850) 
post_Fallujah -0.437*** -0.164 -0.685*** -0.138 
 (0.159) (0.279) (0.197) (0.259) 
Constant 3.315*** -23.67 4.123*** 2.626*** 
 (0.374) (18.21) (0.319) (0.736) 
     
Observations 199 21 110 119 
R-squared 0.308 0.840 0.449 0.231 
Number of qada 42 8 10 42 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 37: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces - All 
Communities, All Waves 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks 
      
Shia_Arab -0.0341** -0.0293** -0.0283** -0.0280** -0.0132 
 (0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0139) 
Sunni_Arab -0.0177 -0.0194 -0.0179 -0.0173 -0.00618 
 (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0168) 
Kurd -0.0154 0.00628 0.00938 0.00849 0.0478 
 (0.0356) (0.0352) (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0353) 
Other 0.0414 0.0475 0.0454 0.0422 0.0379 
 (0.0581) (0.0568) (0.0568) (0.0572) (0.0554) 
water 0.00224 0.00421 0.00270 0.00209 1.59e-05 
 (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0110) 
cookfuel 0.0200* 0.0212* 0.0233** 0.0228** 0.0139 
 (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0114) 
gas 0.0302** 0.0244* 0.0209 0.0209 0.0144 
 (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0128) 
elec -0.0139 -0.0253 -0.0246 -0.0242 -0.0204 
 (0.0189) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0181) 
unemployed  0.155*** 0.153*** 0.151*** 0.123*** 
  (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0388) (0.0383) 
security   0.00997 0.00843 -0.0286** 
   (0.0110) (0.0113) (0.0137) 
conf_CF    0.0141 0.0153 
    (0.0259) (0.0253) 
post_Fallujah     0.0274*** 
     (0.00674) 
post_Askaria     0.00165 
     (0.00426) 
Constant 0.0532*** 0.0355*** 0.0336*** 0.0329*** 0.0221* 
 (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0128) 
      
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 
R-squared 0.118 0.162 0.164 0.165 0.223 
Number of qada 44 44 44 44 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 38: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces - Four-
Model Comparison 
 All Sunni qadas Baghdad Nationwide 
VARIABLES F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks 
     
Shia_Arab -0.0132  0.00186 0.0114** 
 (0.0139)  (0.0244) (0.00556) 
Sunni_Arab -0.00618  0.00984 -0.0220*** 
 (0.0168)  (0.0263) (0.00719) 
Kurd 0.0478  0.114 0.0101 
 (0.0353)  (0.141) (0.0122) 
Other 0.0379  0.152 0.000496 
 (0.0554)  (0.117) (0.0196) 
water 1.59e-05 -0.000369 0.00646 0.00395 
 (0.0110) (0.0139) (0.0214) (0.00434) 
cookfuel 0.0139 -0.000492 0.0158 -0.00324 
 (0.0114) (0.0329) (0.0301) (0.00438) 
gas 0.0144 0.00836 0.000758 0.00466 
 (0.0128) (0.0465) (0.0279) (0.00551) 
elec -0.0204 0.0316 -0.174*** 0.00109 
 (0.0181) (0.0234) (0.0597) (0.00611) 
unemployed 0.123*** 0.00393 0.573*** 0.00532 
 (0.0383) (0.0518) (0.125) (0.0130) 
security -0.0286** -0.00686 -0.00861 -0.00705 
 (0.0137) (0.0484) (0.0449) (0.00501) 
conf_CF 0.0153 0.00698 -0.0162 -0.00547 
 (0.0253) (0.0605) (0.0784) (0.00935) 
post_Fallujah 0.0274***  0.0399**  
 (0.00674)  (0.0155)  
post_Askaria 0.00165 -0.00968 0.0219* -0.00391* 
 (0.00426) (0.00621) (0.0125) (0.00231) 
post_rapemurder  -0.0135*  -0.00362 
  (0.00692)  (0.00275) 
Constant 0.0221* 0.0527*** 0.00401 0.0226*** 
 (0.0128) (0.00786) (0.0231) (0.00514) 
     
Observations 362 51 150 282 
R-squared 0.223 0.182 0.370 0.121 
Number of qada 44 9 10 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 39: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government - 
All Communities, All Waves 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks 
      
Shia_Arab -0.0341** -0.0293** -0.0283** -0.0263* -0.0135 
 (0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0137) 
Sunni_Arab -0.0177 -0.0194 -0.0179 -0.00782 0.000601 
 (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0167) 
Kurd -0.0154 0.00628 0.00938 -0.0129 0.0240 
 (0.0356) (0.0352) (0.0353) (0.0356) (0.0358) 
Other 0.0414 0.0475 0.0454 0.0396 0.0334 
 (0.0581) (0.0568) (0.0568) (0.0561) (0.0545) 
water 0.00224 0.00421 0.00270 -0.00688 -0.00673 
 (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0111) 
cookfuel 0.0200* 0.0212* 0.0233** 0.0227** 0.0157 
 (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0112) 
gas 0.0302** 0.0244* 0.0209 0.0188 0.0127 
 (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0126) 
elec -0.0139 -0.0253 -0.0246 -0.0292 -0.0261 
 (0.0189) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0180) 
unemployed  0.155*** 0.153*** 0.150*** 0.118*** 
  (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0382) (0.0379) 
security   0.00997 -0.000567 -0.0330** 
   (0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0133) 
conf_gov    0.0514*** 0.0498*** 
    (0.0169) (0.0172) 
post_Fallujah     0.0227*** 
     (0.00681) 
post_Askaria     -0.00245 
     (0.00437) 
Constant 0.0532*** 0.0355*** 0.0336*** 0.00300 -0.00313 
 (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0159) (0.0155) 
      
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 
R-squared 0.118 0.162 0.164 0.189 0.243 
Number of qada 44 44 44 44 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 40: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government - 
Four-Model Comparison 
 All Sunni qadas Baghdad Nationwide 
VARIABLES F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks 
     
Shia_Arab -0.0135  -0.00671 0.0107* 
 (0.0137)  (0.0231) (0.00556) 
Sunni_Arab 0.000601  0.0325 -0.0209*** 
 (0.0167)  (0.0253) (0.00718) 
Kurd 0.0240  0.123 0.00410 
 (0.0358)  (0.130) (0.0126) 
Other 0.0334  0.175 -0.00286 
 (0.0545)  (0.109) (0.0195) 
water -0.00673 0.000259 -0.0142 0.00321 
 (0.0111) (0.0132) (0.0201) (0.00436) 
cookfuel 0.0157 0.00707 0.0395 -0.00336 
 (0.0112) (0.0315) (0.0287) (0.00436) 
gas 0.0127 0.00522 -0.0209 0.00449 
 (0.0126) (0.0443) (0.0265) (0.00549) 
elec -0.0261 0.00145 -0.217*** 0.000868 
 (0.0180) (0.0265) (0.0564) (0.00607) 
unemployed 0.118*** 0.0158 0.636*** 0.00417 
 (0.0379) (0.0495) (0.119) (0.0130) 
security -0.0330** -0.0266 -0.0307 -0.00922* 
 (0.0133) (0.0462) (0.0405) (0.00484) 
conf_gov 0.0498*** 0.0385* 0.125*** 0.00948 
 (0.0172) (0.0206) (0.0308) (0.00656) 
post_Fallujah 0.0227***  0.0337**  
 (0.00681)  (0.0147)  
post_Askaria -0.00245 -0.00881 0.0236** -0.00416* 
 (0.00437) (0.00592) (0.0117) (0.00225) 
post_rapemurder  -0.0112  -0.00319 
  (0.00666)  (0.00272) 
Constant -0.00313 0.0464*** -0.0809*** 0.0172*** 
 (0.0155) (0.00820) (0.0300) (0.00626) 
     
Observations 362 51 150 282 
R-squared 0.243 0.260 0.442 0.127 
Number of qada 44 9 10 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 41: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police - All 
Communities, All Waves 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks 
      
Shia_Arab -0.0341** -0.0293** -0.0283** -0.0281** -0.0152 
 (0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0137) 
Sunni_Arab -0.0177 -0.0194 -0.0179 0.00191 0.00947 
 (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0180) (0.0175) 
Kurd -0.0154 0.00628 0.00938 0.00232 0.0390 
 (0.0356) (0.0352) (0.0353) (0.0350) (0.0350) 
Other 0.0414 0.0475 0.0454 0.0183 0.0142 
 (0.0581) (0.0568) (0.0568) (0.0568) (0.0553) 
water 0.00224 0.00421 0.00270 -0.00136 -0.00148 
 (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0108) 
cookfuel 0.0200* 0.0212* 0.0233** 0.0208* 0.0138 
 (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0112) 
gas 0.0302** 0.0244* 0.0209 0.0200 0.0140 
 (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0126) 
elec -0.0139 -0.0253 -0.0246 -0.0307* -0.0272 
 (0.0189) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0180) 
unemployed  0.155*** 0.153*** 0.148*** 0.117*** 
  (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0382) (0.0379) 
security   0.00997 0.00335 -0.0291** 
   (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0132) 
conf_IP    0.0552*** 0.0513*** 
    (0.0180) (0.0182) 
post_Fallujah     0.0230*** 
     (0.00679) 
post_Askaria     -0.00185 
     (0.00432) 
Constant 0.0532*** 0.0355*** 0.0336*** -0.00771 -0.0123 
 (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0183) (0.0178) 
      
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 
R-squared 0.118 0.162 0.164 0.189 0.242 
Number of qada 44 44 44 44 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 42: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police - Four-
Model Comparison 
 All Sunni qadas Baghdad Nationwide 
VARIABLES F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks 
     
Shia_Arab -0.0152  -0.0128 0.0106* 
 (0.0137)  (0.0239) (0.00553) 
Sunni_Arab 0.00947  0.0504* -0.0187** 
 (0.0175)  (0.0281) (0.00730) 
Kurd 0.0390  0.107 0.00640 
 (0.0350)  (0.133) (0.0121) 
Other 0.0142  0.118 -0.00912 
 (0.0553)  (0.112) (0.0198) 
water -0.00148 -0.00224 0.000465 0.00312 
 (0.0108) (0.0140) (0.0200) (0.00433) 
cookfuel 0.0138 -0.000280 0.0145 -0.00307 
 (0.0112) (0.0326) (0.0287) (0.00434) 
gas 0.0140 0.0110 -0.00289 0.00515 
 (0.0126) (0.0462) (0.0265) (0.00547) 
elec -0.0272 0.0233 -0.179*** -8.37e-05 
 (0.0180) (0.0246) (0.0567) (0.00608) 
unemployed 0.117*** -0.0112 0.603*** 0.00396 
 (0.0379) (0.0545) (0.121) (0.0129) 
security -0.0291** -0.00878 -0.0254 -0.00862* 
 (0.0132) (0.0469) (0.0413) (0.00475) 
conf_IP 0.0513*** 0.0138 0.111*** 0.0132** 
 (0.0182) (0.0176) (0.0343) (0.00661) 
post_Fallujah 0.0230***  0.0330**  
 (0.00679)  (0.0151)  
post_Askaria -0.00185 -0.00948 0.0195 -0.00403* 
 (0.00432) (0.00616) (0.0120) (0.00224) 
post_rapemurder  -0.0106  -0.00295 
  (0.00771)  (0.00271) 
Constant -0.0123 0.0475*** -0.0702** 0.0128* 
 (0.0178) (0.0103) (0.0317) (0.00704) 
     
Observations 362 51 150 282 
R-squared 0.242 0.196 0.417 0.134 
Number of qada 44 9 10 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 114 
 
Table 43: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army - All 
Communities, All Waves 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks 
      
Shia_Arab -0.0341** -0.0293** -0.0283** -0.0301** -0.0166 
 (0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
Sunni_Arab -0.0177 -0.0194 -0.0179 0.00117 0.00974 
 (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0174) (0.0170) 
Kurd -0.0154 0.00628 0.00938 0.00235 0.0396 
 (0.0356) (0.0352) (0.0353) (0.0347) (0.0346) 
Other 0.0414 0.0475 0.0454 0.0355 0.0304 
 (0.0581) (0.0568) (0.0568) (0.0558) (0.0541) 
water 0.00224 0.00421 0.00270 3.37e-05 -0.000626 
 (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0107) 
cookfuel 0.0200* 0.0212* 0.0233** 0.0212* 0.0138 
 (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0111) 
gas 0.0302** 0.0244* 0.0209 0.0201 0.0139 
 (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0125) 
elec -0.0139 -0.0253 -0.0246 -0.0354* -0.0317* 
 (0.0189) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0180) 
unemployed  0.155*** 0.153*** 0.134*** 0.104*** 
  (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0383) (0.0380) 
security   0.00997 -0.00101 -0.0343** 
   (0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0133) 
conf_IA    0.0608*** 0.0580*** 
    (0.0166) (0.0163) 
post_Fallujah     0.0241*** 
     (0.00664) 
post_Askaria     -0.00103 
     (0.00419) 
Constant 0.0532*** 0.0355*** 0.0336*** -0.00764 -0.0140 
 (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0166) (0.0162) 
      
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 
R-squared 0.118 0.162 0.164 0.199 0.253 
Number of qada 44 44 44 44 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 44: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army - Four-
Model Comparison 
 All Sunni qadas Baghdad Nationwide 
VARIABLES F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks 
     
Shia_Arab -0.0166  -0.0161 0.0105* 
 (0.0137)  (0.0241) (0.00553) 
Sunni_Arab 0.00974  0.0425 -0.0200*** 
 (0.0170)  (0.0271) (0.00719) 
Kurd 0.0396  0.105 0.00644 
 (0.0346)  (0.133) (0.0121) 
Other 0.0304  0.152 -0.00340 
 (0.0541)  (0.111) (0.0194) 
water -0.000626 -0.000172 -0.00522 0.00307 
 (0.0107) (0.0138) (0.0202) (0.00433) 
cookfuel 0.0138 0.00337 0.0120 -0.00313 
 (0.0111) (0.0332) (0.0287) (0.00434) 
gas 0.0139 0.00924 0.000312 0.00523 
 (0.0125) (0.0463) (0.0265) (0.00547) 
elec -0.0317* 0.0241 -0.180*** -0.000807 
 (0.0180) (0.0253) (0.0567) (0.00613) 
unemployed 0.104*** -0.000683 0.472*** 0.00187 
 (0.0380) (0.0517) (0.124) (0.0130) 
security -0.0343** -0.0189 -0.0472 -0.00920* 
 (0.0133) (0.0512) (0.0425) (0.00478) 
conf_IA 0.0580*** 0.0119 0.108*** 0.0122** 
 (0.0163) (0.0184) (0.0332) (0.00615) 
post_Fallujah 0.0241***  0.0398***  
 (0.00664)  (0.0149)  
post_Askaria -0.00103 -0.00949 0.0180 -0.00395* 
 (0.00419) (0.00618) (0.0120) (0.00224) 
post_rapemurder  -0.0122*  -0.00318 
  (0.00713)  (0.00269) 
Constant -0.0140 0.0495*** -0.0564* 0.0146** 
 (0.0162) (0.00933) (0.0288) (0.00645) 
     
Observations 362 51 150 282 
R-squared 0.253 0.191 0.418 0.134 
Number of qada 44 9 10 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 45: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Armed National 
Opposition (Insurgency) - All Communities, All Waves 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks 
      
Shia_Arab -0.0362* -0.0337* -0.0335* -0.0375* -0.0230 
 (0.0206) (0.0199) (0.0201) (0.0207) (0.0204) 
Sunni_Arab -0.0237 -0.0178 -0.0176 -0.0127 0.00725 
 (0.0252) (0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0255) (0.0252) 
Kurd -0.0955 -0.0262 -0.0238 -0.0392 0.0664 
 (0.0911) (0.0904) (0.0930) (0.0952) (0.0960) 
Other 0.0488 0.0472 0.0461 0.0446 0.0800 
 (0.0888) (0.0861) (0.0868) (0.0870) (0.0846) 
water 0.00647 0.00865 0.00822 0.00805 0.00683 
 (0.0164) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0159) 
cookfuel 0.0199 0.0203 0.0206 0.0216 0.0296 
 (0.0196) (0.0190) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0195) 
gas 0.0249 0.0209 0.0203 0.0218 0.00513 
 (0.0210) (0.0204) (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0214) 
elec 0.00338 -0.0175 -0.0177 -0.0160 -0.00927 
 (0.0309) (0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0298) 
unemployed  0.234*** 0.234*** 0.237*** 0.205*** 
  (0.0647) (0.0650) (0.0651) (0.0643) 
security   0.00182 0.00119 -0.0467** 
   (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0200) 
conf_ANO    -0.0168 -0.0323 
    (0.0217) (0.0214) 
post_Fallujah     0.0344*** 
     (0.00930) 
post_rapemurder     0.00133 
     (0.00690) 
Constant 0.0653*** 0.0378** 0.0373* 0.0440** 0.0247 
 (0.0174) (0.0185) (0.0190) (0.0209) (0.0210) 
      
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 
R-squared 0.119 0.176 0.176 0.179 0.242 
Number of qada 43 43 43 43 43 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 46: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Armed National 
Opposition (Insurgency) - Four-Model Comparison 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks F.pctatks 
     
Shia_Arab -0.0230  -0.0215 0.0209** 
 (0.0204)  (0.0302) (0.00819) 
Sunni_Arab 0.00725  0.0606* -0.0363*** 
 (0.0252)  (0.0353) (0.0122) 
Kurd 0.0664  0.137 0.00362 
 (0.0960)  (0.211) (0.0295) 
Other 0.0800  0.205 -0.0128 
 (0.0846)  (0.137) (0.0333) 
water 0.00683 0.0161 0.0240 0.00861 
 (0.0159) (0.0163) (0.0244) (0.00634) 
cookfuel 0.0296 -0.0589 0.0460 0.0211*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0455) (0.0403) (0.00728) 
gas 0.00513 0.0882 -0.0125 -0.0113 
 (0.0214) (0.0520) (0.0386) (0.0104) 
elec -0.00927 0.108 -0.152* -0.0123 
 (0.0298) (0.0629) (0.0798) (0.00961) 
unemployed 0.205*** 0.0783 0.573*** -0.00575 
 (0.0643) (0.0616) (0.146) (0.0201) 
security -0.0467** 0.129 -0.0269 -0.0203*** 
 (0.0200) (0.101) (0.0492) (0.00691) 
conf_ANO -0.0323 0.0885*** -0.0996*** 0.0154* 
 (0.0214) (0.0241) (0.0359) (0.00803) 
post_Fallujah 0.0344*** 0.0128* 0.0423* 0.0158*** 
 (0.00930) (0.00658) (0.0214) (0.00341) 
post_rapemurder 0.00133 0.00132 -0.0118 0.00637*** 
 (0.00690) (0.00540) (0.0169) (0.00196) 
Constant 0.0247 -0.0483** 0.0241 0.00524 
 (0.0210) (0.0219) (0.0277) (0.00885) 
     
Observations 240 28 120 160 
R-squared 0.242 0.748 0.390 0.347 
Number of qada 43 8 10 43 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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